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Abstract
The international small arms norm is emerging, and soon UN member-states will have a chance to 
formally accept and show their commitment to the norm by signing the UN Arms Trade Treaty.  
Will the United States, a key member of the international community and a critical state for the 
small arms norm, bind itself to the norm through the ATT? The Obama administration seems very 
supportive of the ATT and the small arms norm. However, in order for the US to ratify the treaty, it 
has to be ratified by two-third majority in the US Senate. What are the chances of the US Senate 
ratifying the ATT? The Senate is a body that is open to domestic pressures more than to the 
international influences and norms. The NRA, the most influential gun lobby in the United States, is 
the biggest domestic pressure that senators must relate to in this context. This thesis attempts to find 
out how likely it is that the US Senate will ratify the ATT. In order to do this, I examine three 
aspects of the power of the NRA: financial resources, ability to frame the debate and to mobilize its 
members and other gun owners into participating in political activities, and analyze various 
pressures the senators are facing in regards to the ATT vote.
7
8
List of Tables and Figures
Figure 5.1    Trends in global arms sales between 2004 and 2011                                             36
Figure 7.1    NRA contributions to Senators in the most recent election                                   59
Figure 7.2    Lobbying Expenditures of the NRA and Brady Campaign                                    60
Table  7.1    Republicans ranked by index                                                                                  70
Table 7.2     Democrats ranked by index                                                                                     71
Appendix
Table A1    List of Republican senators not analyzed in this research                                       92
Table A2    List of Democrat senators not analyzed in this research                                          93
Table A3    Index Calculations                                                                                                    94
9
10
Chapter 1: Introduction
The proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons has been one of the growing security 
issues of the post-Cold War Era. Light weapons are cheap, easy to transport, and readily available, 
which makes them weapons of choice for many engaged in violent conflicts. Small arms and light 
weapons are used everyday and everywhere, contributing to international insecurity. The ongoing 
conflict in Syria, just like other recent events in the Middle East, North Africa, recent wars in 
Burma, Congo, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra-Leone have all demonstrated in tragic detail the 
importance of effective regulation of arms transfer between states. They have also shown that there 
is a need for common standards for international transfer of small arms and light weapons, and 
legally binding requirements for all states to review imports and exports, in particular for arms 
transfers that could lead to violations of human rights. 
In response to these developments, many governments and other actors have been voicing 
concerns about the absence of globally agreed rules to guide their decisions on arms transfers. 
Given the serious nature of the small arms issue, numerous states, NGOs and individual activists 
have sought to address various small arms problems. One of the earliest suggestions was to develop 
international standards and norms of behavior that would outline the parameters of acceptable small 
arms activities, for example not selling arms if there is a possibility that they would be used to 
commit human rights violations. International relations scholars recognize that the behavior of 
states is to a large degree guided by international norms, which are the standards of appropriate 
behavior for states  (Finnemore & Skikkink 1998: 891). The argument is that normative 
prescriptions ultimately must underlie all measures to address small arms issues, but despite various 
actions taken by states and NGO's in an effort to combat small arms problems, corresponding norms 
are still relatively weak. Some argue that the UN Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons from 2001 was not only the first significant step in norm development, but an 
unprecedented and path breaking event, and a fundamental step in the creation of global norms 
(McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 214).  While it did put the small arms norms on the international 
agenda, it did not establish a firm normative framework to guide multilateral activities concerning 
small arms, as the PoA is not legally binding. However, there is now a light at the end of the tunnel.
Since 2006, the UN has been working on a legally binding treaty that would create a 
framework for international transfers of weapons, and on April 2nd 2013 the UN General Assembly 
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voted in favor of the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Even though the treaty was by no means 
uncontroversial and took seven years to negotiate, the end result reflects growing international 
awareness and sentiment that the multibillion-dollar conventional weapons trade (which include 
small arms and light weapons) must be held to a moral standard. Moreover, there is now a 
widespread agreement that in order to effectively control the transfers of small arms and light 
weapons around the world, there must be a legally binding framework that all states follow.
Given the prominent position of the US as a global arms exporter, with the US trade in 
conventional weapons amounting to 40% of the global total, any attempt aimed at regulating 
international arms trade would have limited relevance without its participation. The United States 
already has an extensive and rigorous system of controls on national basis, and a very strong export 
control system in place, and most agree it is the 'gold standard' of export controls for arms transfers 
(Clinton 2009). However, because the US is a key player in the realm of weapons transfers and the 
world’s leading arms exporting nation, it is not enough that the US has strict regulations governing 
the trade of weapons. In fact, many think that the United States has a special responsibility to play a 
leadership role in the creation of the norm and in developing a treaty that would become a legally 
binding framework setting common standards for all international transfers of small arms and light 
weapons. While some treaties and norms may function well even without the US participation, this 
scenario would be far from ideal for an ATT and small arms norm. Given the prominent position of 
the US as a global arms exporter, any such treaty would have limited relevance without its 
participation. Although long-established norms do change, and new norms do evolve, norm 
evolution in small arms area is not likely unless the the US, world's largest weapons producer and 
exporter, buys into and support the process. The key test of whether an international norm is truly 
accepted is whether the parties intend to bind themselves in agreeing to particular behavior, and 
international treaties are the clearest expressions of whether the states consent to be legally bound. 
The US did not participate in the efforts to establish a treaty until 2009 when the US 
reversed its policy of outright opposition to the treaty and joined the negotiations. At first the US 
was not the easiest partner to work with. The first round of treaty negotiations took place in July 
2012, but because the US asked for more time, the first series of negotiations ended without 
reaching an agreement. However, after the presidential elections, president Obama and the 
Administration reaffirmed their commitment to reaching an agreement on the ATT. The second 
round of negotiations on the ATT took place in March 2013. The ATT failed to achieve unanimous 
support during the negotiations. However, it garnered the support of a majority of member states 
when put to a vote in the UN General Assembly, and the US was one of 154 countries that voted for 
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adopting the ATT (UN News Center 2013).  
As the Administration is fairly outward-looking internationally, it cares about how other 
states see it, and it seems like through supporting the ATT, the Obama administration is responding 
to the international pressure for the creation of small arms norm. However, in order for the treaty to 
enter into force, it has to be ratified by two-third majority in the US Senate. It is already very clear 
that this will not be easy for the United States. The Senate is not an outward-looking body. Even 
though some international norms might filter into the Senate, this might not be enough in this 
context, given how powerful the actors who are trying to create the counter-norm are. The Senate is 
much more exposed to various domestic pressures than to international norms and international 
pressures. One of the domestic pressures is a very influential gun lobby with the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) at the forefront, and the NRA has managed to turn the debate on international 
weapons transfers to a debate about the ideology, American values, the Constitution, and the right 
to bear arms at home. 
According to analyzes by many experts, including various NGOs, the American Bar 
Association, and the UN itself, the ATT is solely aiming at regulating international weapons 
transfers, and will not affect domestic arms regulations. There is a widespread agreement that the 
treaty would simply bring other countries up to US standards, and would in all likelihood not 
require the United States to do anything more than it is already doing. However, as already 
mentioned, the treaty has very vocal opposition in the United States – the American gun lobby. Pro-
gun groups, most notably the NRA, have been trying to derail virtually all initiatives that could 
potentially limit the free flow of firearms both domestically and internationally for a long time, and 
it is no different with the Arms Trade Treaty. If the Administration controlled the public debate, the 
ATT would be discussed as any other international treaty. However, the NRA has managed to turn 
the debate about the ATT into a debate about domestic gun control. 
Given how powerful the NRA is, and the influence it has both on the political debate and the 
Congress, the question of  whether or not the Senate will ratify the Arms Trade Treaty, and whether, 
therefore, the US will become engaged in the emerging small arms norms is closely related to the 
developments in the gun control debate in the US. Consequently, in order to answer these questions, 
it is necessary to look into the domestic situation in which the debate is taking place. This is what 
this thesis attempts to do.
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Chapter 2: Problem statement and research questions
As mentioned in the introduction, the United States already has an extensive and rigorous system of 
controls in place, and most agree it is the “gold standard” of export controls for arms transfers 
(Clinton 2009). The US has regulations for arms export licensing, reporting, and, at least for major 
weapons systems, congressional sign-off. In addition, the US already regulates arms brokers and 
has provisions in law that are meant to curb sales to human rights abusers and conflict zones 
(Hartung 2012a). 1The US also engages other states to raise their standards on bilateral basis, and 
has also supported high international standards on multilateral basis. According to the 
Administration, the ATT presents the US with the opportunity to promote the same high standards 
for the international community that the US and many other responsible arms exporters already 
have in place  to ensure that weaponry is transferred for legitimate purposes (Clinton 2009). 
The ATT, designed to foster peace and security by putting a stop to arms flows to conflict 
regions, thus preventing human rights abusers and violators of the law of war from being supplied 
with arms (UNODA 2013). The treaty prohibits transfers of conventional arms, ammunition and 
parts and components if the transfer would violate relevant international obligations. States are 
prohibited from authorizing any transfers if they have knowledge that the arms or items would be 
used 'in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians, or other war crimes defined by 
international agreements to which the State is a party (ICRC 2013). Moreover, in the Preamble, the 
ATT recognizes ''the legitimate political, security, economic, and commercial interests of States in 
the international trade in conventional arms'', and reaffirms ''the sovereign right of any State to 
regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or 
constitutional system'' (UN General Assembly 2013: 1). Many experts have already said that the 
ATT would not require the US to do more than it is already doing, and that the regulation of 
domestic gun possession is completely outside the scope of the treaty. However, the US gun lobby 
is still not convinced, and the ATT has been linked to the US domestic gun debate by the gun lobby, 
with the NRA arguing that the US cannot ratify the treaty as it is a grave threat to the Second 
Amendment. 
1According to William D. Hartung, the director of the Arms Security Project at the Center for International Policy, 
while the US already has restrictions that are more rigorous than those in most other nations, they must be enforced far 
more consistently
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Virtually any discussion about any form of gun control, whether domestic or international, are 
always controversial in the United States. According to the UN, the American Bar Association and 
many other experts, the ATT will have nothing to do with the domestic gun control (Oxfam 
America 2013, American Bar Association 2013). Gabor Rona, international legal director of Human 
Rights First and international law professor at Columbia University concluded that ''the circle 
created by the treaty and the circle created by the Second Amendment simply don't intersect at all'' 
(Raum 2012), and the Obama administration has repeatedly stated that it opposes any infringement 
on domestic arms transfers and ownership, and would not vote for any treaty that infringes on 
American citizens' rights granted by the Second Amendment (Kimball & Hoffman 2012). Still, the 
ATT has been made into a domestic gun control issue by the NRA. Because of the group's financial 
resources, its ability to mobilize gun owners into participation in political activities, and its ability 
to frame, and arguably control, the domestic political debate, the NRA is a very powerful group that 
''no politician should oppose if they want to keep their job'' (Hartung 2012b). Many politicians fear 
the power of the NRA, and it is the politicians in the United States Senate that have the fate of the 
ATT in their hands now, as the treaty must be ratified by the two-third majority in the Senate. This 
thesis is going to explore three aspects of NRA's power – resources, ability to mobilize members, 
and ability to frame the political debate, and the main questions it attempts to answer are the 
following:
1. Why is the NRA able to exert this much power?
2. How likely is it that the US will actively participate in the emerging small arms norm by ratifying  
the Arms Trade Treaty?
2.1 Overview of the thesis
This thesis will begin by presenting two theoretical vantage points to guide this research in Chapter 
3. The first one, international norms, provides an overarching framework for understanding the 
small arms issue and the Arms Trade Treaty process, and the current state of the emerging small 
arms norm. The resource mobilization theory will guide the analysis of NRA's power. Chapter 4  
shows what research design the thesis follows. Chapter 5 presents an overview of the international 
scene in the area of small arms and light weapons, explaining why the issue of small arms and light 
weapons is so important for the international community. It also presents an overview of the state of 
the small arms norm, and explains why the US participation is crucial for the success of the ATT 
and the emerging small arms norm. It then shows the history of efforts to create a UN Arms Trade 
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Treaty, and explains how both the Obama administration and the NRA have been engaged with this 
issue. Chapter 6 explains the domestic context in which the discussions on the Arms Trade Treaty 
will be taking place. This includes a brief overview of the most relevant aspects of the US gun 
control debate, with a particular focus on the recent developments and the political climate after the 
Sandy Hook tragedy, and how both the Obama administration and the NRA reacted to the massacre. 
Because the NRA has managed to make the ATT about domestic gun control, understanding the 
domestic situation in which the political debate is taking place is crucial for understanding whether 
it is possible for the US to ratify the treaty and thus actively participate in the creation of the small 
arms norm. 
Chapter 7 will discuss why the UN ATT faces an uphill battle in the US Senate. First it 
explains how the NRA is able to exert power over politicians, which enables the group to make the 
debate about the ATT, a treaty that according to experts has nothing to do with domestic gun 
control, precisely about domestic gun control. In order to do this, this thesis looks into three aspects 
of the group's power that the resource mobilization literature and the literature on debate itself 
identify as the most important: NRA's financial resources, its ability to mobilize members  to be 
politically active, and its ability to frame the political debate. However, the NRA's ability to 
mobilize members and its ability to frame the debate are so closely related that they will be 
discussed in one section. The last section of the chapter will explore whether it is possible that the 
ATT will get enough votes in the Senate to be ratified by analyzing different pressures, both 
candidate-specific and state-specific, that the Senators are facing. 
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Chapter 3: Theory
This thesis employs two different theories. The first one, theory on international norms, provides an 
overarching framework for understanding the small arms issue and the Arms Trade Treaty process, 
and the current state of the emerging small arms norm. The resource mobilization theory will guide 
the analysis of NRA's power. This section is going to present an overview of both theories, and 
explain in more detail how they are applied in this research.
3.1 International Norms Theory
International relation scholars recognize that the behavior of states is to a large degree guided by 
international norms, which are the standards of appropriate behavior for states. Norms are 
considered legitimate behavioral claims that must take an aura of legitimacy before they become 
accepted. Norms are obeyed not because they are enforced, but because they are seen as legitimate 
(Florini 1996: 365). Once  they are embedded in social institutions, they start acting like structures, 
shaping states' behavior (Thomson 1993: 72). Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has 
increased interaction among states, and promoted development of international norms in many 
fields (Xuetong 2011: 233). International relations are now highly regulated and restrained by 
norms, and despite occasional breaches there are no indications that most states are actually willing 
to abandon those norms (Bluth 2004: 25; Koh 2012).
International norms constantly evolve, and new norms are also created. One way to look at 
how norms emerge is to look at the evolution of treaties. Taking the theory of international norms 
dynamics as a framework, this paper will look into what role the US plays in the evolution of the 
US Arms Trade Treaty and the small arms norm. The Obama Administration's decision to reverse 
previous Bush opposition to ATT was potentially massive in its impact, because the U.S. is the 
largest conventional arms trader in the world. According to Brian Wood, disarmament expert for 
London-based Amnesty International, by entering the negotiations the Obama administration has 
decided to do ''diplomatic heavy lifting'' (Varner 2009). Without US support, ''the process may have 
been formally agreed in the sense of getting a majority vote, but negotiations would not have been 
conducted at a seriously high level'' (Ibid.).  In April 2013 the United States voted the adoption of 
the Arms Trade Treaty in the UN General Assembly. However, in order for the treaty to enter into 
force in the United States, it has to be ratified by the two-third majority in the US Senate. While it 
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seems that the Obama Administration is supporting the small arms norm, the key test of an 
international norm is whether the parties intend to bind themselves in agreeing to particular 
conduct, and treaties are the clearest expression of states consent to be legally bound (McDonald 
and Sattaneo 2003 215-216). The key question is, then, will the US Senate ratify the Arms Trade 
Treaty?
Two of the most influential theorists of international norms, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink (1998), argue that norms evolve in patterned 'life cycles'. Norm influence may be 
understood as a three stage process, the stages being norm emergence, norm acceptance, and norm 
internalization. Norms emerge through being persuaded by norm entrepreneurs who try to convince 
a critical mass of states to embrace a new norm. After norm entrepreneurs have convinced a critical 
mass of states to adopt new norms, we can say that the norm reaches a tipping point. It is not 
possible to predict how many states must accept a norm in order for it to 'tip' the process, although 
some empirical studies suggest it has to be at least one-third of total states in the system, but it 
matters which states adopt the norm. Some states are critical to a norm's adoption, and what 
constitutes critical states vary from issue to issue. While the theory is fairly vague on the criteria 
states have to meet for them to be considered critical to a particular norm, the United States seems 
to be a critical state for the small arms norm because it is the world's biggest producer of 
conventional arms. Finnemore & Skikkink (1998) say that one of the criteria is moral leadership 
(901). It can be argued whether the US still has moral leadership. However, the US still is a very 
important player on the international arena. Moreover, the fact that Nobel Peace Laureates, norm 
entrepreneurs who put the need for small arms norm on the international agenda, wrote a letter to 
president Obama in March 2013, during the second ATT negotiations, urging him to take the lead at 
securing the ATT, suggests that the US indeed is a critical state when it comes to small arms norm.
The second stage of norm life cycle is characterized by a dynamic of imitation, whereby the 
norm leaders try to persuade other states to become norm followers. This happens mostly through 
the process of international socialization, and this socialization can be done by states, networks of 
norm entrepreneurs and international organizations. The main reason why states comply with norms 
in stage two is related to their identities as members of the international society. If states do not 
comply with the international norm, they can be labeled a rogue state, and being called a rogue state 
in international relations entails loss of reputation, trust and credibility. During the last stage, norm 
internalization, norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public 
debate. Norms then become so widely accepted that their 'taken-for-granted' quality makes 
conformance with the norm virtually automatic (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 895-905).
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One way to look at how norms emerge is to look at the evolution of  treaties. The United Nations 
Programme of Action was a unique expression of global consensus on issues related to small arms, 
and arguably constituted a watershed in efforts to tackle small arms problem, especially in terms of 
development of international norms (McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 247-248). The PoA, however, 
is not a legally binding framework, although soft law often constitutes the first step in the 
formulation of appropriate responses to global problems, and fills ''the normative vacuum and 
anticipat[es] the harder, more detailed regulation offered by treaties or international customary law'' 
(McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 219). As the time passes and state practices accumulate, 'soft' norms 
may be translated into treaty form, and the involvement of international organizations, especially 
the United Nations, is usually crucial in this process (Ibid.).
With this much world-wide support for the UN Arms Trade Treaty, it is very likely that a 
new norm on responsible arms transfers between states is emerging. The role of the US in this 
context however is still uncertain. As mentioned earlier, some states are critical to a norm's 
adoption, and what constitutes critical states vary from issue to issue. While some treaties and 
norms may function well even without the US participation, this scenario would be far from ideal 
for ATT and small arms norm. Given the prominent position of the US as a global arms exporter, 
and because the US is such an important player on the international system, any such treaty would 
have limited relevance without the US participation. Although long-established norms do change, 
and new norms do evolve, norm evolution in small arms area is not likely unless the the US, world's 
largest weapons producer and exporter, buys into and support the process (Grillot 2011: 544).  As 
already mentioned, it seems that the Obama Administration is supporting the small arms norm. 
However, the key test of an international norm is whether the parties intend to bind themselves in 
agreeing to particular conduct, and treaties are the clearest expression of states consent to be legally 
bound (McDonald and Sattaneo 2003 215-216). The overwhelming support for the UN ATT, and 
the fact that the United States did vote for the adoption of the ATT in the UN General Assembly, is 
of course very important. However, the significance of treaties is limited as long as they have not 
entered into force (Ibid. 247).
There are two main reasons why the emergence of the small arms norm has been so difficult. 
The first reason is that, in brief, new norms do not emerge in a normative vacuum (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998: 897). Norm entrepreneurs are crucial for norm emergence as they call attention to 
issues, or sometimes even 'create' issues ''by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes 
them'' (Ibid.). The construction of cognitive frames, often referred to as 'framing', is an essential 
component of norm entrepreneurs' political strategies. When they are successful, the new frames 
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end up resonating with broader public understandings, and become adopted as new ways of talking 
about issues. However, what is important in this context is that in constructing the frames, norm 
entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions 
of interest and appropriateness (Ibid.). For example, in case of women's suffrage and women's 
rights, norm entrepreneurs encountered alternative norms regarding women's interests and what the 
appropriate role of women should be. In other words, 'new norms never enter a normative vacuum 
but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other 
norms and perceptions of interests' (Ibid.). The small arms norm, like all other norms, must 
therefore emerge in a competitive normative environment, and in this case small arms norm must, at 
least to a degree, compete against firmly established norms of sovereignty, self-defense and 
territorial integrity, which can be in a direct conflict with limitation on state and non-state action the 
small arms norm could place (Grillot 2011: 540). In addition, some states and various pro-gun 
groups such as the NRA in the United States, are attempting to create counter-norms, or insert 
competing norms. For example, the norm of free trade collides with the idea of regulating and/or 
restricting arms transfers. This normative conflict has been preventing clear, direct and strong 
action on global gun control (Ibid.). 
The other main, and arguably more important in this context, reason why the emergence of 
the small arms norm has been difficult is very powerful pro-gun lobby that is actively working 
against the establishment of the small arms norm, both in the US itself and internationally. 
Although the small arms issue is much more salient today, the impact of an existing pro-gun, anti-
control legal and normative framework has perhaps hampered the development and evolution of 
international small arms control norms (Grillot 2011: 536). Pro-gun coalitions insist that people 
have equal opportunity to legally own firearms, and the NRA and other pro-gun groups fight all 
efforts to control firearms, as they believe that the systematic disarming of people is happening 
across the globe today (Ibid. 541). These groups work both at home and internationally, and the 
NRA has opposed the UN Arms Trade Treaty from the outset, fighting against it both at the UN and 
at home through lobbying the Senate. A very influential conservative think-thank in the United 
States, the Heritage Foundation, has also been very vocal in its opposition to the ATT. Just like the  
NRA, the Heritage Foundation opposed the treaty even before the first draft was published, on 
ground that the ATT would pose serious risk to the US sovereignty (Bromund 2012a). The 
foundation called Obama's and Kerry's 'pursuit' of international treaties ''a classic liberal agenda, 
which will only lead to a further erosion of American global leadership'' (Payne & Coffey 2013). 
The Heritage Foundation also fears that the ATT is part of a process that will ''inspire judges and 
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legal theorists who believe that the Constitution needs to be reinterpreted in light of transnational 
norms'' (Bromund 2012c), and that ATT will be bad for the US interests ''and will keep US 
diplomats busy fending off more ideas for years to come'' (Bromund 2012b). While the Heritage 
Foundation agrees with the NRA that the treaty poses risks to the Second Amendment rights, the 
Foundation argues that ATT raises much broader concerns for US foreign policy (Bromund 2012d). 
Even though the US voted for the ATT in the General Assembly, the treaty still has to be 
ratified by the two-third majority of the US Senate, something that is bound to be very difficult. 
Millions of people in the United States believe that the Second Amendment gives them right to bear 
arms with virtually no restrictions, and any global attempt to limit this right, no matter how real or 
perceived, results in a norm collision that can hinder the development, diffusion and 
internationalization of small arms norms (Grillot 2011: 543). The NRA has been doing all in its 
power to lobby against the treaty, both at the UN and in the US Senate. It has failed at the UN, but 
the Senate is an inward-looking body much more prone to domestic pressures from powerful groups 
such as the NRA. In addition, domestic influences are strongest at the early stage of a norm's life 
cycle, and once norms become institutionalized in the international system, domestic influences 
lessen significantly (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 893). As the small arms norm is still far from 
being firmly established, the domestic influence of the NRA is a force to be reckoned with.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, until 2009 the US has been placing a damper on the small 
arms process at the UN, and it was the only country that in 2006 voted against a resolution 
authorizing the UN to develop a comprehensive Arms Trade Treaty. In 2009 the Obama 
Administration reversed the US previous opposition to the ATT, and on April 2nd 2013 the US 
voted for the adoption of the ATT in the UN General Assembly. This suggests that the 
Administration is open to the international influence and to the emerging small arms norm. 
However, as already mentioned, the key test of an international norm is whether the parties intend 
to bind themselves in agreeing to particular conduct, and treaties are the clearest expression of states 
consent to be legally bound (McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 215-216). In order for the US to be 
legally bound by the ATT, the ATT has to pass through the Senate, where it must be ratified by the 
2/3 majority. So far the Senate has been prone to the NRA influence and very negative towards the 
Arms Trade Treaty. But have the recent domestic events changed this situation? 
President Obama vowed to make gun control a pillar issue of his 2nd term, and has chosen 
the Vice President Joe Biden, a long-time gun control advocate, to lead an initiative to tackle gun 
violence on a policy level. Polls show that US citizens are now more positive to gun control 
measures then they have been in a very long time, but it is still uncertain whether the massacre at 
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Sandy Hook elementary school where Adam Lanza killed 20 children and six adults on December 
14 2012 changed the public opinion enough for these changes to be implemented. The NRA has 
managed to make the discussion on ATT into a domestic gun-control debate. The NRA failed its 
mission to defeat the ATT at the UN, and is now putting a lot of resources into making sure that the 
ATT will be defeated in the US Senate. The NRA has vowed multiple times that it will continue to 
''work with our allies, particularly in the U.S. Senate, to insure that the Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms is not threatened by this or any future international treaty'' (NRA-ILA 2012 d). Clearly, the 
NRA is doing a lot, including employing its formidable political muscle, considerable financial 
resources, and through their skillful narrative and framing attempts to defeat the ATT and the 
emerging small arms norm. 
3.2 Resource mobilization theory
Resource mobilization theory developed during the 1970s, when a new generation of scholars tried 
to understand the emergence, significance and effects of the social movements of the 1960s 
(Edwards & Gillham 2013: 1). The theory attempts to explain social movements by viewing 
individuals as rational actors who are engaged in instrumental actions that use formal organizations 
to secure resources and foster mobilization (Crawford 2011). The NRA is an interest group, not a 
social movement. However, what the NRA and social movements have in common is the main aim, 
which is achieving some collective good. Much of the NRA activity focuses on just that – achieving 
collective good, which to the group, its members, and many gun owners is the ability to possess 
firearms without restrictions. Resource mobilization theory analyzes various resources that 
contribute to the social movements' ability to achieve their goals, which is also relevant in the case 
of the NRA, and seems like a very good tool to analyze how the group achieves its objectives.
Different formulations of the Resource Mobilization Theory focus on different resources 
that they think are crucial to the success of groups. In general, there are five different resources: 
moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material (Edwards & Gillham 2013: 3). Moral 
resources include for example legitimacy, integrity, and solidarity support. Cultural resources 
include artifacts and cultural products such as conceptual tools. Human resources include labor, 
experience, skills, expertise and leadership; social-organizational include infrastructures, social 
networks and organizations, and material resources include among others monetary resources 
(Ibid.). 
Gun control advocates blame failure to pass stricter gun laws on the NRA which mobilizes 
grassroots opposition to gun control using ''extremist rhetoric'', engages in intensive lobbying at all 
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levels of government, and uses campaign contributions ''to reelect its allies and punish its enemies'' 
(Lytton 2005: 154). According to various analyzes, the power of the NRA is rooted in many factors, 
the most important of them being the financial resources, the groups ability to mobilize its five 
million membership base to participate in various political activities, and the groups ability to 
control the national debate about guns (Berlow & Witkin 2013). The NRA gathers information on 
gun control and other issues important to the members, disseminates the information to the 
members, represents its members to elected officials, reports to the membership the behaviors of 
elected officials, and helps shape public opinion on issues (Kenny, McBurnett and Bordua 2006: 4). 
It seems like according to many commentators and analysts, the NRA is using many resources that 
RMT accounts for, the most important of them being material (money it spends on campaign 
contributions, lobbying politicians and independent expenditures), cultural (framing and creating 
narrative that resonates with their target group, which is mainly gun owners), and social-
organizational (ability to mobilize its members into participating in political activities, from voting 
and writing senators to participating in venues that build common identity).
Analyzing the resources the NRA spends is fairly straight-forward and does not need much 
explanation here (section 4.0 will explain what indicators this thesis uses for this category). What is 
more difficult to grasp and deserves more explanation and focus here is framing, which contributes 
to NRA's ability to both mobilize its members, and control the political debate on guns.
A 'frame' is an interpretative schema that individuals use to interpret reality by omitting and 
emphasizing various aspects of the world selectively. Framing places value on certain aspects of 
individual identity, and various frame alignment processes reconcile individual identities to enable 
the formation of collective identities. Skillful framing involves finding and stressing commonalities, 
creating new personal identities, and attempting to minimize conflicts. Moreover, ''antagonist 
identity fields'' also serve to strengthen collective identities, as boundary frames that identify 'us' 
and 'them' serve to bind the group together (Crawford 2011). Each frame has four main tasks 
(Bailey 2009: 81; see also e.g. Snow, Soule & Kriesi 2004; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford 
1986). First it provides a diagnosis of the problem, specifies its nature, and identifies its cause. 
Second, it offers a prognosis through explaining how the problem is best tackled, and provides 
tactics and targets. Third it dichotomizes the players into clearly defined 'us' and 'them', and the last 
task provides a rationale for engaging in collective action (Bailey 2009: 81). 
The analysis of the NRA's power will discuss how the group employs different resources it 
has at its disposal, the most important of them being, as explained above, material resources (money 
it spends on campaign contributions, lobbying politicians and independent expenditures), cultural 
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(framing and creating narrative that resonates with their target group, which is mainly gun owners), 
and social-organizational (ability to mobilize its members into participating in political activities, 
from voting and writing senators to participating in venues that build common identity, closely 
related to framing).
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Chapter 4: Research design
This chapter will present an overview over how the research questions will be answered. This 
includes explaining the focus of each question, showing what kind of data was collected, and how 
the data will be analyzed.
The main questions this thesis attempts to answer are:
1. Why is the NRA able to exert this much power?
2. How likely is it that the US will actively participate in the emerging small arms norm by ratifying  
the Arms Trade Treaty?
For a long time the NRA has been able to control the national debate about guns, and put significant 
pressure on the Congressmen (Berlow & Witkin 2013). Now it has managed to make the debate on 
the UN Arms Trade Treaty into a domestic debate on gun control. Even though the Obama 
Administration supports the ATT and the US voted for the adoption of the ATT in the UN General 
Assembly, in order for the treaty to enter into force it has to be ratified by the two-third of the 
Senate. The Administration is outward-looking internationally, which means it is also influenced by 
international norms and pressures. The Senate, however, is a much more inward-looking body, and 
it is mostly influenced by various domestic pressures, and one of the biggest pressures the Senate is 
facing in the realm of political gun control debate is the NRA.
Without a doubt, NRA is a very powerful group. It was named the most powerful 
Washington lobby in 2001 by the Fortune magazine (Heningan 2009: 1), and it still has a reputation 
of a group that ''no politician should oppose if they want to keep their job'' (Hartung 2012b). It is not 
surprising that the politicians are scared of the NRA power, as candidates with NRA backing have 
an 81% success rate in state legislative races (Grillot 2011: 541).  In fact, gun-control activists say 
that because officials live in fear of the NRA, the group has been able to get even more powerful 
and extreme (Brady 2012).  However, the important question is, why is the NRA able to exert this 
much power?
 In order to answer the first research question (Why is the NRA able to exert this much 
power?), after reviewing the resource mobilization theory and extensive literature on the topic of 
NRA's political power, the decision was made to analyze different aspects of the power of the NRA. 
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According to the literature, the power of the NRA is rooted in many factors, the most important of 
them being the financial resources, the group's ability to mobilize its five million membership base2 
to participate in various political activities, and its groups ability to control the political debate 
about guns (Berlow & Witkin 2013). It is these three factors the following chapters will analyze. 
However, as already mentioned, NRA's ability to mobilize its members and the group's ability to 
frame the political debate are so closely related that they will be examined jointly in one section.
In order to examine the role of NRA's financial resources in influencing the political debate, 
this paper looks at the resources the NRA uses on lobbying senators, political campaigns and  
independent expenditures, and compare those resources with what gun-control groups use for the 
same purposes. It also looks at who the NRA gives most money too, as it shows the picture of 
NRA's influence and allegiances in the US Senate. Most of the data used for this part of the analysis 
is gathered from Sunlight Foundation and Center for Responsive Politics, but also from articles that 
cover the topic of NRA's financial resources and how the group uses them.
In order to understand the power of mobilization of the NRA members and gun owners, this 
thesis explores how the NRA mobilizes its members and other gun owners, and why politically 
active gun owners are more powerful than the public opinion. Moreover, to fully understand the 
inability of the United States to move decisively towards sensible gun regulation, one has can not 
simply focus on understanding the political power NRA has (Heningan 2009: 5). Thus, the question 
is why the NRA is able to exercise this kind of power. Clearly, there must be something in the 
groups message that resonates with many people (Ibid.). The NRA has been able to control political 
debate about guns, and make an international treaty (ATT) about the domestic gun control. Many 
people, including politicians who actually have the power to reject the treaty, believe the NRA 
narrative. In order to find out how the NRA is able to mobilize people and why the group is able to 
do it so effectively I had to find information about how NRA mobilizes people. In addition to 
resource mobilization theory literature, I looked at an article published in the Journal of Political 
Behavior to help me figure out what to focus on. The article explains how the NRA frames the 
discussion, making the gun issues appeal to people's self interest and identity, and how the group 
uses different venues to advance its agenda and raise the importance of the gun issue. In order to 
examine this, the paper looks mostly at articles about the ATT published by the NRA's legislative 
arm (NRA-ILA) at their official web-page, as they are a very good example of the framing 
techniques the group is using to appeal to their members and other gun owners.
2 The NRA does not publish official membership numbers, and it seems that the membership claim of almost five 
million appears a little exaggerated. For a more detailed analysis and discussion about the NRA membership see 
Kessler (2013) and Harkinson (2013).
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In order to answer the second question (How likely is it that the US will actively participate in the 
emerging small arms norm by ratifying the Arms Trade Treaty?) this paper attempts to find out 
whether it is possible that enough Senators (sixty-seven) will vote for the ratification of the Arms 
Trade Treaty. To do this, first a list of key Senators for the vote was identified, and then political 
pressures these Senators are facing were identified and analyzed. 
The first step was to eliminate Senators that are virtually guaranteed to vote against the 
treaty. These were identified according to four criteria – representing a state with two Republican 
senators, NRA rating (A), voting against background checks amendment, and signing of senator 
Moran's letter opposing the ATT in 2011 if they were already in office. These are the senators that 
are so likely to vote against the ATT in the Senate that they will not be included in the further 
analysis, as the main goal of  the analysis is identifying possible swing votes that might vote for the 
treaty, and analyze those in more detail. Conversely, a list of Senators who will most likely vote for 
the treaty was also identified, and these will also not be included in the further analysis. The 
Senators who would virtually certainly vote for the Arms Trade Treaty were also identified 
according to 4 criteria – representing a state with two Democrat senators, NRA rating (F), voting for 
background checks amendment, and not signing of senator Moran's letter opposing the ATT in 
2011.
In order for the ATT to be ratified in the Senate, it needs two-third Senate approval, which 
means the Obama administration needs 67 senators to vote for the treaty.3 After the first narrowing 
down steps, it looks like 26 Republican Senators will most likely oppose the ATT, and 24 
Democrats will most likely vote for the treaty. This leaves 50 senators that could potentially be 
conflicted on the legislation, and out of these, at least 43 must vote for the ATT in order for it to get 
past the Senate. 
In order to find out whether it is possible for the Obama Administration to get these votes, 
decision was made to analyze senators based on different pressures they are facing, both senator-
specific and state-specific. For each of those pressures (factors) I constructed a scale from one to 
five. Each senator was awarded points from one (lowest) to five (highest) on each individual factor, 
and the results were collapsed into a single index, which indicates how likely it is that the senator 
will vote for the ATT. The senators with the highest score on the index are most likely to vote for 
3 It is worth noting that the current Senate is composed of fifty-three Democrats, forty-five Republicans, and two 
independent senators. This means that in order for the ATT to be ratified, even assuming that all Democrats would vote 
for the ratification (which, as this analysis shows later, is very unlikely), at least fourteen Republicans (alternatively, 
twelve Republicans and both independent Senators, or thirteen Republicans and one independent) would also have to 
vote for the ATT. 
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the ATT, and senators with lower score are most likely to vote against the ATT.
Senator-specific pressures this analysis includes are:
1) NRA funding since 1990. The assumption is that the more money from the NRA senator has 
received, the less likely he\she will be to vote for the ATT. The data for the analysis is collected 
from Center for Responsive Politics.
2) The NRA rating. The NRA grades candidates based on their voting record on gun issues or on a 
questionnaire, and awards them grades from ''A+'' to ''F''.
• ''A+'' grade means 'Excellent voting record' and 'vigorous effort' on gun rights
• ''A'' means 'solidly pro-gun', backed NRA on key votes or has positive record on gun rights
• ''B'' means that the senator may have opposed 'pro-gun' reform or backed some gun 
restrictions
• ''C'' is "Not necessarily a passing grade" and ''mixed record" on gun votes.
• ''D'' grade means ''anti-gun'' supporter of ''gun control legislation'' who ''can usually be 
counted to vote wrong on key issues''
• ''F'' means ''True Enemy of gun owners' rights'' (The Washington Post 2013)
The assumption is that the higher NRA rating, the less likely the Senator will be to vote for ATT. In 
addition, this factor is so important (it shows how senators vote on gun control related issues, and as 
already mentioned, the NRA has managed to make the discussion about ATT into a domestic gun 
control issue) that it is weighed double. The data is taken from the New York Times (2012). 
State-specific pressures this analysis takes into account are:
1) Share of the Obama vote in 2012 election in the state. The assumption is that the more Obama 
vote in the state, the more likely the Senator will be to vote for ATT. The data comes from NBC 
news coverage of the presidential election in 2012.
2) The number of registered firearm dealers in the state per 100.000 citizens. The population 
numbers taken from census from 2010 (United States Census 2010), and the number of gun dealers 
from Mayors Against Illegal Guns (2013 a) who gathered the data Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives, Jan. 2013 (at the time of writing this thesis it was not possible to access 
this data from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives directly). According to the 
Sunlight Foundation this was one of the most important factor contributing to how the senators 
voted on the background checks amendment, and in this analysis, this factor, like the NRA rating 
factor, was weighed twice. The assumption is that the more firearm businesses per 100.000 people, 
the less likely the Senator will be to vote for ATT. To find how many firearms businesses per 
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100.000 citizens with this data, I divided population of the state by 100000, and divided the number 
of gun businesses by the result.
3) The percentage of gun owners in the state. Another important pressure on gun issues, with New 
York Times data guru Nate Silver suggesting that it is one of key factors to look at (Berlow & 
Witkin 2013). The assumption is that the more gun owners in the state, the less likely the Senator 
will be to vote for ATT. The data was taken from Deborah White's (2013) article ' Gun Owners as a 
Percentage of Each State's Population'.
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Chapter 5: Small Arms Norm
This chapter will provide an overview over the international gun control context. It will present 
relevant issues, which include the need for regulating the international trade of small arms and light 
weapons, the history of efforts leading to the UN ATT, the importance of the US to the ATT and 
the small arms norm, and the positions of key players in the debate about the ATT in the US: the 
Obama administration and the NRA.
5.1 International gun control context
While nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and acts of terror may make the headlines, it is 
conventional arms (a category that includes small arms and light weapons) that kill far more people. 
The Control Arms Campaign estimates that at least 300 000 people are killed every year by small 
arms and light weapons, with countless others enduring all the other miseries of armed conflict 
(Cornish 2008: 30). The proliferation of conventional arms contributes to human rights violations, 
breaches of international humanitarian law, it intensifies and prolongs armed conflict, threatens 
national, regional and international stability, and is an impediment to sustainable peace, 
reconciliation and long term stability (Wallacher & Harang 2011: 3; Cukier & Chapdelaine 2001: 
28). 
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There have long been calls to address the issue of conventional weapons transfers. Various national, 
bilateral and regional attempts to regulate weapons transfers have also been put in place, but the 
international market in conventional weapons has been stubbornly resistant to effective regulation 
(Cornish 2008: 30-31). For a long time the arms trade has been one of the very few areas of 
economic activity where there was virtually no international regulation, and globalization has made 
the access to arms very easy (McGrew 2008: 27). In the area of conventional weapons, there has 
simply been a patchwork of arrangements established by groups of states in various formats, mostly 
regionally. However, even though there is an array of national, regional and international 
instruments that govern the transfer of certain weapons, the view of the UN has always been that the 
absence of a global, legally binding framework for regulating trade in conventional arms ''has 
obscured transparency, comparability and accountability'' (Geneva Academy 2012).
The UN Programme of Action (PoA) which emerged from the 2001 UN Small Arms 
Conference is often described as a fundamental step in the creation of global norms. The UN 
Secretary-General said the PoA was essential in building norms, and some commentators went even 
further, claiming that the PoA ''gives concrete expression to a range of small arms norms'' 
(McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 215). The PoA's preamble cites the need to strengthen or develop 
norms and measures at national, regional and global levels, but there has been a debate on the 
nature of this call to action, since the PoA is not legally binding. The level of commitment among 
participants of the Conference was sufficiently strong to have worldwide normative significance. 
However, did the PoA really establish a firm normative framework to guide multilateral small arms 
activity? Some thought the PoA was unprecedented and path-braking, others concludes that the 
conference was a complete failure and a missed opportunity (Krause 2002). 
What the PoA definitely did accomplish, was putting the issue of small arms and light 
weapons on the international security agenda after the decade-long effort (Ibid.). However, the key 
test of international norms is whether the parties are willing to commit to being legally bound to 
particular behavior, and international treaties are the clearest expressions of whether states consent 
to be legally bound (McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 215-216), and in the PoA, all recommendations 
related to legally binding treaties, to a big degree at the US insistence, had been removed 
(Schroeder & Stohl 2006). 
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5.1.1 Small Arms and light weapons
While there is no universally accepted definition of either small arms or light weapons, the 1997 
UN Panel of Governmental Experts is usually used as a template for the classification (McDonald 
2001: 251). The Panel considered portability a defining characteristic, deciding that small arms and 
light weapons are defined as weapons including private and military weapons that can be carried by 
an individual or a small number of people, or transported by a pack animal or a light vehicle (Ibid). 
The Panel's list is organized into small arms, which include revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles, 
carbines, assault rifles, sub-machines and light machine guns; and light weapons, which include, 
among others, heavy machine guns, mortars of calibers of less than 100 mm, and portable anti-
aircraft guns (McDonald 2001: 251).
The emergence of the small arms and light weapons problem onto the international agenda is 
a relatively new development. During the Cold War the international system took on bipolar 
character which inadvertently suppressed more regional conflicts (Nye 1996: 65). After the Cold 
War ended, the balance of power has changed and regional conflicts became much more 
widespread. As a result, the international community began to focus its attention on internal rather 
than inter-state conflicts, and these developments consequently resulted in growing awareness of 
the pervasive role small arms and light weapons have in those conflicts (Parker & Wilson 2012: 
26). In Rwanda, almost a million people were massacred in under a month by Hutus armed with 
machetes and protected by AK-47 wielding soldiers. In Liberia, a civil war that lasted more than a 
decade was fought primarily with small arms and light weapons, took lives of 250.000 people, and 
displaced almost half the country's population. These are just two examples of the developments 
that led to the convening of a 1996 UN Panel of Governmental Experts, which produced a report 
recommending that the UN hold an international conference on the issue (Schroeder & Stohl 2006).
The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
was held in July 2001 in New York. It was preceded by three meetings of the Preparatory 
Committee which outlined the basic elements of the Programme of Action (Parker & Wilson 2012: 
28). The conference was the most intense of all the efforts surrounding the small arms and light 
weapons issue up to that day. The primary purpose was to coordinate and consolidate small arms 
initiatives and develop an agenda for action (Schroeder & Stohl 2006). In July 2001, a total of 134 
statements were made either by or on behalf of 171 different countries. During the conference, 
ninety-eight countries underlined the importance of providing international assistance to the 
countries that needed it the most or that were most affected by the small arms problem, mostly 
South-African countries (McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 230-231). Ninety-five states underlined the 
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importance of marking and tracking weapons in order to determine the origin of, and transfer routes 
taken by small arms, thereby preventing their diversion from legal to illicit markets (Ibid. 231). 
Other measures mentioned were disarmament, export controls, brokering, information exchange, 
export criteria, involvement of civil society, regulation of civilian possession, weapons collection 
and destruction, criminalization of illicit activity, cooperation among law enforcement agencies, 
national legislative measures, improving compliance with arms embargoes, and raising public 
awareness (231-232). 
By the time the conference opened, there was a consensus on large parts of the provisional 
Programme of Action, and all the aforementioned measures and principles, with two notable 
exceptions, export criteria and the regulation of civilian possession, found their way into the final 
PoA, though ''with varying degrees of strength and specificity'' (McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 
232). Some issues remained contested, among them the links between the illicit trade and the 
legitimate rights of states to buy and sell weapons, civilian possession of firearms, issues of export 
controls, and follow-up mechanisms such as national reporting and review processes. Thus, despite 
many areas on which the countries could agree, the conference was by no means uncontroversial. 
While some members, such as Canada and the European Union countries, saw the conference as a 
chance to develop international norms in an area where few existed, the United States was wary 
with respect to domestic issues, such as the question of civilian firearms possession and transfer to 
non-state actors. These measures were dropped at the last minute at the insistence of the United 
States (Parker & Wilson 2012: 27, McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 232). 
The issues of norms and standards with respect to civilian possession of weapons, and 
follow-up processes aimed at negotiating legally binding treaties, were particularly contentious 
(Schroeder & Stohl 2006). Although the conference did manage to produce a program of action, 
and member states were able to agree on various issues, the plan that was formulated was often 
considered inadequate to deal with the problems that small arms and light weapons cause. Many 
countries as well as observers were disappointed with the result of the conference (Stohl 2001). 
While some commentators thought the PoA was an important step forward, others claimed that the 
conference produced a weak action program, and resulted only in a mechanism of encouraging 
voluntary cooperation (Bromund 2012 f). When the Programme of Action was finalized, all 
references to civilian possession, non-state actors, and all recommendations related to legally 
binding treaties had been removed (Schroeder & Stohl 2006). 
The United States was the most vocal in its opposition, but it was not alone. China, Cuba, 
and some other states silently supported the positions advocated publicly by the United States, and 
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some commentators  have claimed that other states, equally hostile to the measures the US objected 
to officially, decided to hide their opposition so that the US alone would take the resulting political 
heat (Schroeder & Stohl 2006, McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 232). However, many states made it 
very clear that they considered the banning of transfers to non-state actors and the regulation of 
civilian firearms possession to be absolutely essential tools for combating the proliferation and 
misuse of small arms and light weapons (McDonald and Sattaneo 2003: 233)
It has become very clear that effective small arms measures require viable implementation 
mechanisms, and it is equally clear that an appropriate international response to the devastating 
consequences caused by small-arms proliferation and misuse can be nothing short of a legally 
binding force with meaningful enforcement , something that the Programme of Action failed to 
provide (Efrat 2010: 125; McDonald 2001: 283). This is why the Arms Trade Treaty adopted in 
April 2013, a binding agreement that includes small arms and light weapons, is potentially a 
milestone in establishing an international norm on small arms and light weapons. However, the key 
test of an international norm is whether the parties intend to bind themselves in agreeing to 
particular conduct, and treaties are the clearest expression of states consent to be legally bound 
(McDonald and Sattaneo 2003 215-216). The overwhelming support for the UN ATT, and the fact 
that the United States did vote for the adoption of the ATT in the UN General Assembly, is of 
course very important, but the significance of treaties is limited as long as they have not entered into 
force (Ibid. 247). Despite the support from the Obama Administration, it still remains to be seen 
whether the US will ratify the treaty thereby formally supporting the small arms norm. The 
following sections will provide an overview over the rationale for an Arms Trade Treaty and the 
steps that led to the overwhelming approval of the UN ATT in April 2013, with focus on the role 
the United States has played in these efforts.
5.1.2 UN Arms Trade Treaty
According to the Small Arms Survey 2009, in 2006 approximately 4.5 million firearms were traded 
at a total of USA $ 1.7 billion. The global trade in small arms and light weapons consists of newly 
produced weapons as well as surplus arms. It is also worth noting that trade in sporting rifles, 
sporting shotguns, pistols and revolvers is much bigger than in firearms made to military 
specifications (Small Arms Survey 2013a). 
The trade in small arms and light weapons is dominated by a small number of countries. For 
example, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Russia, 
France, China and the United Kingdom), together with Germany and Italy account for around 85% 
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of the arms sold between 2004 and 2011 (Shah 2013a). The value of arms transfer agreements 
worldwide (this includes transfers to both developed and developing nations) in 2011 was $85.3 
billion, which was an extraordinary increase over the 2010 total of $44.5 billion, making the total in 
2011 by far the highest worldwide arms agreements total since 2004 (Grimmett & Kerr 2012: 3). In 
2011, the US led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, and made agreements valued at $66.3 
billion, which constituted 77.7% off all agreements (Ibid.)
Developing nations are the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons 
suppliers, and between 2004 and 2011 conventional transfer agreements to developing nations (all 
countries except the US, Russia, European countries, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) 
comprised 73.7% of the value of all international arms transfers agreements (Grimmett & Kerr 
2012: 1). Most analysts agree that the potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts with 
use of these weapons is the greatest in developing nations (Ibid. 1) . The graph below shows the 
difference between arms sales between developed and developing nations, with developing nations 
being the clear majority of arms sales recipients.
Figure 5. 1 Trends in global arms sales between 2004 and 2011
source: Shah (2013b)
Although recent years showed signs of declining sales, 2011 saw a massive jump, almost solely by 
what the report describes as an “extraordinary” increase in market share by the US, whose massive 
sales to Saudi Arabia distorted an otherwise downward trend in arms sales (Shah 2012b). It is also 
worth noting that while the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons occurs in all parts of the 
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globe, it is also concentrated in areas afflicted by armed conflict, violence and organized crime, 
where the demand for illicit weapons is often highest (Small Arms Survey 2013b).
The UN Arms Trade is a treaty aimed at regulating global trade in conventional weapons, 
and thereby curbing the sale of weapons that kill tens of thousands of people every year. The treaty 
intends to establish common international standards for export, import and transfer of conventional 
weapons, which would prevent terrorists, criminals and human rights violators from acquiring such 
weapons (MacFarquhar 2013). 
The contemporary Arms Trade Treaty process began with the initiative launched by Nobel 
Laureates in the late 1990s, which was an inspiration for a 2006 UN General Assembly Resolution 
(61\89) (Kimball 2011). The Nobel Laureates were critical to the creation of the small arms norm. If 
one applies Finnemore's and Skikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework, they were the norm 
entrepreneurs who put the small arms issue on the international agenda. Norm entrepreneurs are 
critical to norm emergence as they call attention to issues, and sometimes even 'create' them, by 
using language that 'names, interprets, and dramatizes them' through the process of framing, trying 
to convince the critical mass that the norm should be adopted (897). Norm entrepreneurs do not stop 
after introducing the idea of the norm, but continue their efforts at making the norm widely 
accepted. When the second round of ATT negotiations was taking place in March 2013, a group of 
18 Nobel Peace Prize winners sent an open letter to President Obama calling upon him to help 
secure the ATT (PSR 2013). The fact that norm entrepreneurs target US directly is another sign of 
how important US participation is in the context of both the ATT and the small arms norm.
Resolution (61\89) requested the UN Secretary General to seek views of member states on 
the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument which 
would establish common international standards for export, import and transfer of conventional 
arms. The resolution was co-sponsored by the United Kingdom, Argentina, Australia, Finland, 
Japan, Kenya and Costa Rica. It was opposed by the United States, and the United States under the 
Bush administration was in fact the only country to oppose the resolution (Eaves 2013). Despite the 
US opposition, the resolution created a Group of Governmental Experts, who then published a 
report on the scope, parameters, and feasibility of a treaty in August 2008. The report highlighted 
some key issues that would dominate discussions on the treaty, among others the respect for the 
sovereignty of state-parties, objective and agreed upon global criteria for approving arms transfers, 
activities covered in the treaty, and the inclusion of small arms and ammunition within the scope of 
the treaty (UNODA 2013; Kimball 2011).
In December 2008, the UN General Assembly endorsed the report and convened an Open-
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Ended Working group in order to provide a more public forum for further discussions (Kimball 
2011). The main reasons the ATT talks took place at all is that the United States, the world's biggest 
arms trader, accounting for over 40% of global conventional arms transfers, reversed U.S. policy on 
the issue after Barrack Obama was first elected, and decided in 2009 to support the talks on ATT 
(Charbonneau 2012). On 14th October 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 
announced that the United States would support the ATT negotiation process, thereby reversing the 
Bush administration's position, and that it would vote in favor or a General Assembly Resolution to 
create a treaty conference. The United States, however, insisted that any final text that were to 
emerge from the July 2012 conference would have to be adopted by consensus. While many 
countries and organizations praised the decision of the Obama administration to overturn the Bush-
era policy and to proceed with the negotiations to regulate conventional arms sales, various actors 
also criticized the US insistence that the decisions on the treaty must be unanimous. Among others, 
Amnesty International and Oxfam international said in a joint statement that insisting that decisions 
on the treaty be made by consensus could significantly weaken the final deal, urging the 
governments to resist US demands to give any single state the power to veto the treaty (Mohammed 
2009).
The four-week long Diplomatic Conference held at the UN headquarters in New York in 
July 2012 under the presidency of ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina ended without 
agreement (Geneva Academy 2012: 7). There were differences and disagreements between 'more 
progressive ''like minded'' states and so-called ''skeptics'' ' which were difficult to  bridge (Ibid.). 
When the US asked for more time to assess the provisions of the draft treaty, Russia also called for 
more time, and once the two largest arms-exporting states had declared they were not ready to adopt 
the text, the draft's fate was sealed, and the US insistence that the negotiations be undertaken on the 
basis of consensus was perhaps the greatest stumbling block to an agreement (Ibid. 7-8). 
Consequently, the majority of the international community blamed the US for the failure to come up 
with a treaty (Waltz 2012, Gladstone 2012, Easley 2012, Nichols 2012).
Treaty supporters, led by activist groups such as Oxfam America and Amnesty International 
were disappointed by the fact that the White House walked away at a critical moment as it failed to 
move this treaty to conclusion (Gladstone 2012). There were several states, including Syria, North 
Korea, Iran, Egypt and Algeria, who throughout the entire negotiation process opposed arms 
control. It is worth noting that Iran, Syria and North Korea were the countries that later prevented 
the adoption of the ATT during the Mach conference, and their blockade was the reason the treaty 
had to be put to a vote in the General Assembly on April 2nd. It was not a surprise that these 
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countries were against a legally binding treaty that would regulate international arms transfers. 
North Korea and Iran are currently under the UN arms embargo over its nuclear program, and Syria 
is in a civil war hoping Russian and Iranian arms will keep flowing in, commented diplomats 
(Charbonneau 2013). These 'rogue states', however, often violate international norms of behavior, 
and are commonly the subject of ''diplomatic isolation, economic embargo, political and economic 
sanctions'' (Hoyt 2000), and the world was not surprised that they are, mildly put, not supportive of 
an ATT. Ultimately, arms control activists blame the United States for the inability to reach a 
decision. The popular opinion was that in bowing to the gun lobby, ''the Obama administration 
passed up the opportunity to make the world a little more secure. It was a political victory for the 
National Rifle Association, perhaps, but not for Americans or for the world'' (Waltz 2012). The US 
delegation to the UN, however, denied that the timing of the election had anything to do with the 
US decision to delay the talks on the treaty (Easley 2012). 
In 2012, soon after Obama's reelection, the US backed a U.N. Committee's call to renew 
debate over a draft ATT. The resolution calling for a new round of talks in March 2013 passed with 
157 votes in favor, none against, and 18 abstentions (Charbonneau 2013). During the negotiations 
in March, the treaty failed to achieve unanimous support, but garnered the support of the majority of 
Member States when it was put to a vote in the General Assembly on April 2nd. The resolution 
which contained the text of the treaty received 154 votes in favor, 23 countries abstained (among 
others China, Russia, Cuba, India, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia and Sudan), and three member states – 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and Syria voted against the decision (UN News Center 
2013). The adoption of the treaty was welcome by among others Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, 
who hailed it as a powerful new tool in efforts to prevent grave human rights abuses. ''It is a historic 
diplomatic achievement – the culmination of long-held dreams and many years of effort. This is a 
victory for the world's people'' (Ibid.). The treaty took seven years to negotiate, and the end result 
reflects growing international awareness and sentiment that the multibillion-dollar conventional 
weapons trade must be held to a moral standard. 
5.1.2.1 Why the US participation in Arms Trade Treaty is so important 
Already in 1795, in his famous essay 'To Perpetual Peace', Immanuel Kant argued that transnational 
ties and transnational cooperation create moral interdependence, and these lead to greater 
possibilities for peace through international agreement (Koh 1997: 2610). After World War II, there 
was great support in the United States for new kind of world order that was based on cooperation 
among nations, and the US was in the vanguard of those proclaiming and defending explicit visions 
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of human rights (Kurtz & Cravatta 2008). Historically, the US has played a seminal role in the 
establishment of international courts, tribunals and other bodies to adjudicate a broad system of 
treaties and conventions governing the behavior of countries on the international arena (Kull 2006: 
1). It can be argued that the United States was the primary architect of the post WWII international 
system, and some even go as far as to say that the United States has played a key role in civilizing 
international politics (Nolan 1998: 3). However, in the last decades the US has lost the leading role. 
For example, the country has resisted being subjected to the jurisdictions of various international 
treaties and conventions. Among others, the Bush administration refused to participate in the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and reducing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction 
over the United States citizens. The Bush administration has also sought to narrow the reach of 
various treaties and conventions, among them the Geneva conventions (Kull 2006: 1). 
Consequently, US foreign policy has in many cases become unilateral. The Bush 
administration blocked adoption of numerous treaties, and over an even longer period the Senate 
both failed and refused to ratify treaties already signed, a behavior that has appalled and angered the 
world community (Kurtz & Cravatta 2008). Noam Chomsky has even gone so far as to describe US 
and Israel as rogue states that do not follow international norms (because they are powerful enough 
to ignore them) (Ali 2012). In recent years, the United States has been out of step with its closest 
partners, and increasingly disconnecting itself from various international efforts, and not 
participating in the ICC, the Kyoto Protocol, land mine conventions and the law of the sea 
convention are only a few examples of this trend. It seems like now the world is going one way, 
developing new norms and frameworks of cooperation, while the US is going in a different 
direction, being increasingly on the outs with the international society. In fact, according to Murray 
(2007) one of the leading sources of anti-Americanism relates to America's 'arrogance' in failing to 
sign or ratify international treaties that the rest of the world endorses. 
Even though the United States still considers itself the leader of the free world, and there is 
no doubt that the country is still a crucial member of the international community and central to the 
world, the world is now working together through various frameworks and treaties, even when the 
US refuses to be a part of them. Developments of the last decade thus show that the world can work 
together without the US, and do it well. However, it is different with the issue of small arms and 
light weapons, and the UN Arms Trade Treaty. Given the prominent position of the US as a global 
arms exporter, any treaty aimed at regulating international arms trade would have limited relevance 
without its participation. Because the US is a key player in the realm of weapons transfers and the 
world’s leading arms exporting nation, many think that the United States has a special responsibility 
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to play a leadership role in the creation of the small arms norm and in developing a treaty that 
would become a legally binding framework setting common standards for all international weapons 
transfers. Long-established norms do change, and new norms do evolve, but norm evolution in 
small arms area is not likely unless the the US buys into and support the process. While it seems 
that the Obama Administration really is supporting these processes, the key test of international 
norms is whether the parties intent to bind themselves in agreeing to particular behavior, and 
international treaties are the clearest expressions of whether the states consent to be legally bound 
(McDonald and Sattaneo 2003 215-216). Even though the Obama Administration is supportive of 
the ATT and the small arms norm, it is still unsure (and as this thesis will show later, it is in fact 
unlikely) whether the US Senate will ratify the ATT. Thus, even though the Administration itself 
supports the treaty and the norm, the country might still end up being a laggard in the creation of the 
small arms norm and the ATT process.
At the outset of his first administration, President Obama spoke of the need for a global 
response to global challenges, which was consequently followed by a move toward various 
multilateral engagements. Even though President Obama still hasn't reversed many of Bush's 
extrajudicial policies (Parry 2012), the Administration prides itself in participating in multilateral 
organizations. In fact, the country's role in developing international rules and norms is often 
portrayed as a success of Obama's first-term foreign policy (Palacio 2013). These engagements, 
however, were largely taken outside the framework of formal institutions such as the UN, and the 
hard truth is that the US is still very often reluctant to trade its sovereignty for multilateral solutions 
(Ibid.).
In 2009, Obama reversed previous Bush opposition to negotiations on Arms Trade Treaty, 
and the United States did vote to approve UN Arms Trade Treaty on April 2nd 2013, signaling that 
the Administration is committed to tackling the problem of conventional weapons trade 
internationally through a binding framework. However, the prospects for ratification of the treaty in 
the Senate appears bleak, at least in the short term (McFarquhar 2013). Some commentators think 
the ATT will likely languish in the Senate for a very long time, in part because of opposition by the 
gun lobby (Goldberg 2013). Just for comparison's sake, it has been 33 years since Jimmy Carter 
signed the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; 18 Years since Bill 
Clinton signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 17 years since he signed the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and none of those treaties have yet been ratified. ''This is 
all to say, don’t expect the world’s largest exporter of arms to formally join this treaty anytime 
soon.'' (Ibid).
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5.1.2.2 The Obama Administration
As shown in the previous section, in 2009 the Obama Administration reversed the previous Bush 
Administration opposition, and agreed to support and participate in the negotiations on an Arms 
Trade Treaty. In a press statement announcing US support for the ATT negotiations on October 14 
2009, Hilary Clinton said that conventional arms transfers are a crucial national security concern for 
the US, and the country has always supported effective action to control the international arms 
transfers (Clinton 2009). For that reason the US was now prepared to work for strong international 
standards in this area by seizing the opportunity that the Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty 
presents. Moreover, the United States already has an extensive and rigorous system of controls for 
arms transfers, and the ATT initiative presents the US with the opportunity to promote the same 
high standards for the entire international community (Clinton 2009). 
In addition to insisting that the treaty negotiations should be based on consensus, the US 
presented key red lines, among them that the Second Amendment to the US Constitution must be 
upheld, meaning that there must be no restrictions on civilian possession or trade of firearms 
otherwise permitted by law or protected by the US Constitution (U.S. Department of State 2013). 
The administration has been clear from the very beginning that the United States would oppose any 
effort to address internal arms transfers, and oppose any provisions that would conflict with the US 
Constitution or domestic law. The ability to oppose such things is one of the reason why the US 
insisted that a consensus approach is necessary (U.S. Department of State 2010).
After the ATT negotiations failed to produce a treaty in July 2012, the official position of 
the Administration, stated at a press conference by Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson for the 
Department of State, was that the United States did not support a vote in the UN General Assembly 
on the current text, and that while the US sought to conclude the negotiations with a Treaty, it was 
reasonable to request more time for ''such a complex and critical issue'' (Nuland 2012). Nuland said 
that the US supports a second round of negotiations, restating that it has to be conducted on the 
basis of consensus. Nuland also said that the US will continue to work towards an Arms Trade 
Treaty that will contribute to international security, but at the same time protect the sovereign right 
of states to conduct legitimate arms trade. A treaty would have to  meet the concerns and objectives 
that the US has been articulating throughout the negotiations, for example that a treaty should not 
infringe on the constitutional right of American citizens to bear arms (Ibid.). In December 2012, 
soon after Obama's reelection, the US backed a U.N. Committee's call to renew debate over a draft 
ATT. The resolution calling for a new round of talks in March 2013 passed with 157 votes in favor, 
none against and 18 abstentions (Charbonneau 2012). 
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Before the next round of the negotiations in March 2013 Secretary of State John Kerry  issued a 
statement on US support for the Arms Trade Treaty. Kerry announced that the US is steadfast in its 
commitment to achieve a strong and effective Arms Trade Treaty, and that the US supports a treaty 
that will bring all countries closer to existing international best practices 'while preserving national 
decisions to transfer conventional weapons responsibly' (Kerry 2013 a). He also reminded that 
international arms trade is and always will be a legitimate commercial activity (Ibid.). The Secretary 
of State also restated that the US could only be party to a treaty that addresses international transfers 
of conventional weapons solely and does not impose any new requirements on the United States 
domestic trade in firearms or on US exporters. Further, he emphasized that the United States would 
not support any treaty ''inconsistent with U.S. law and the rights of American citizens under our 
Constitution, including the Second Amendment'' (Kerry 2013a), showing that the Administration 
has tried to calm the fears of the US gun lobby, emphasizing at many occasions that they would not 
accept a treaty that would have any impact on the Second Amendment rights of US citizens. Kerry 
finished the statement expressing hope that the countries can reach consensus on a treaty that 
improves global security, advances humanitarian goals, and enhances United States national 
security by encouraging all nations to establish meaningful systems and standards that regulate 
international arms transfers and ensure respect for international law (Kerry 2013a).
After the vote in the UN General Assembly approving the ATT, John Kerry issued another 
statement on the ATT, expressing how pleased the US is that a strong, effective and implementable 
ATT that can strengthen global security while protecting the sovereign right of states to conduct 
legitimate arms trade was approved (Kerry 2013b). In his statement, Kerry explained the ATT's role 
in establishing common international standards for arms transfers that would require all states to 
develop and implement the kind of systems that the US already has in place, and reducing the risk 
that international transfers of conventional arms will be used to carry out the world's worst crimes 
such as terrorism, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. He also pointed out that the 
treaty also preserves the principle that the international conventional arms trade is and will be a 
legitimate commercial activity which allows nations to acquire the arms they need for their own 
security (Ibid.). The Secretary of State also emphasized that the treaty only applies to international 
trade, and reaffirms the sovereign right states have to regulate arms within their territory. As the US 
has required from the outset of treaty negotiations, ''nothing in this treaty could ever infringe on the 
rights of American citizens under our domestic law or the Constitution, including the Second 
Amendment'' (Kerry 2013b). 
In order for the treaty to enter into force, it must be signed and ratified by member states. 
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The ATT will officially enter into force 90 days after the 50th country ratifies it (Goldberg 2013). 
Each country's procedure for signing and ratifying treaties is slightly different. In the United States, 
the President signs the treaties, but it is the Senate that has to ratify them. President Obama is 
expected to sign the treaty within the next two months, but the treaty faces a very tough road to win 
the two-thirds majority support needed in the Senate for approval (Pecquet 2013). One of the 
reasons why it is likely going to be very difficult for the ATT to get the Senate approval is the 
intense lobbying of the NRA. The following section will present these efforts in more detail.
5.1.2.3 The NRA 
''We must never allow the ideals that make America the last, best hope for freedom in the world to  
be destroyed, damaged or diminished in the least. If foreign powers insist upon pushing their idea  
of 'global norms' across our borders, NRA will be the first to alert and mobilize the American  
people to stop them'' (Schmeits 2011). 
If you thought the NRA has restricted its efforts to rolling back gun regulations within US borders, 
you might be very surprised at the groups intense interest in the UN proceedings. The organization 
has been battling a raft of gun control measures on Capitol Hill, but it also has an international fight 
on its hand as it gears up to oppose the UN ATT (Finn 2013). 
As the world governments met at the United Nation in July 2012 to craft a global Arms 
Trade Treaty, the NRA made its voice loud and clear (Hartung 2012a). From the very beginning, 
the supranational efforts by the United Nations to create a binding Arms Trade Treaty has been 
fiercely condemned by the NRA, who fear that it would be the beginning of a 'global gun grab' 
(Question More 2013). To Wayne LaPierre, NRA Executive Vice-President, the ATT would be ''an 
offense to any American who has ever breathed our free air'' (Hartung 2012a). In one of his 
statements, Wayne LaPierre announced ''NRA's strong opposition to anti-freedom policies that 
disregard American citizens' right to self-defense'', adding that ''no foreign influence has jurisdiction 
over the freedoms our Founding Fathers guaranteed to us'' (Easley 2012). The only way to address 
NRA's objections is to simply and completely remove civilian firearms from the scope of the treaty. 
''That is the only solution. On that, there will be no compromise'' (Ibid.). 
After the July 2012 negotiations did not end with a treaty, Wayne LaPierre said that ''no 
foreign influence has jurisdiction over the freedoms our Founding Fathers guaranteed to us'' 
(Pilkington 2013a). The NRA, being widely credited for killing the ATT in July 2012, embraced it 
as a big victory for American gun owners (Ibid.). Before the second round of  the treaty 
negotiations in March 2013, however, many commentators were surprised at the NRA absence 
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during the UN proceedings. It was believed that the NRA was so tied up fighting new gun 
restrictions in the wake of the Newtown shooting, where 20 year old Adam Lanza fatally shot 
twenty-six people (twenty children and six adults), that it has failed to amount its expected 
''lobbying blitz'' against the ATT (Ibid.). For many months the NRA did not apply the same strong 
tactics as it did in 2012, even though according to the group the ATT is a ''ticking time-bomb'' and 
''the most serious threat to American gun owners in decades'' (Ibid.). However, after months of 
silence on the issue, the NRA stepped up its opposition to the ATT in March 2013 (McVeigh 2013) 
According to Tom Mason, the group's executive secretary who has represented the NRA at 
the UN for almost two decades, the treaty needs to address the transfer of large numbers of military 
weapons that lead to human rights abuses. What the NRA really objects to is the inclusion of 
civilian firearms within the scope of the treaty (Finn 2013, McVeigh 2013). In addition, the NRA 
argues that the treaty could infringe on gun rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment, even 
though the American Bar Association, NGOs and the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs claim 
firmly that the ATT would not interfere with the domestic arms trade and the way countries regulate 
civilian possession of firearms (Nichols 2012). Moreover, in a press statement, Secretary of State 
John Kerry also said that the administration would not support any treaty that would be inconsistent 
with the US law and the rights of American citizens under the Constitution (Aronsen 2013 a), but 
such reassurances are unlikely to convince the NRA and its allies, and the NRA is steadfast in its 
opposition to an ATT that includes civilian firearms in its scope. During the negotiations in March 
the NRA has submitted their suggestion to how civilian arms could be defined, but the treaty 
supporters say there is no such thing as 'civilian weapons' that could be treated differently from 
military weapons under the ATT. Michelle Ringuette, chief of campaigns and programs at Amnesty 
International USA, said that there is no distinction between civilian and military weapons, and ''to 
try to create one would create a loophole that would render the treaty inoperative, as anyone could 
claim that he or she is in the business of trading 'civilian weapons' '' (Question More 2013). 
From the onset of Arms Trade Treaty talks,  NRA has not only fought against the ATT in 
the UN, but also lobbied against the treaty at home. Already in 2011, NRA was working to get as 
many US senators as possible to publicly oppose any treaty that would include restrictions on 
civilian arms, trying to ensure that ''any ATT that includes civilian arms is dead on arrival in the 
Senate'' (NRA- ILA 2011c). These efforts resulted in a letter started by Senator Jerry Moran (R-
Kan.) signed by 51 Senators, stating that they would oppose any treaty that in any way restricts the 
rights of law-abiding American gun owners (NRA-ILA 2012d). In addition, ''NRA members made 
their voices heard on this issue as well, calling their elected representatives and urging their 
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opposition to the treaty. As a result, 130 members of the U.S. House of Representatives have voiced 
strong opposition to the treaty'' (Ibid.). On November 13, Rep. Mike Kelly (R-Pa) introduced his 
own resolution strongly urging President Obama not to sign the ATT, NRA asked its members to 
sign Rep. Kelly's online petition ''to help protect our Second Amendment rights by urging the 
president to reject the proposed U.N. Arms Trade Treaty'' (Ibid.). 
After the UN General Assembly voted to adopt the ATT, the NRA announced that for US 
gun owners, the fight has moved to the Senate (NRA-ILA 2013 c). On March 24 2013 NRA issued 
a statement where it thanked Senator Inhofe (R-OK) for leading the effort to prevent the US from 
entering into the UN ATT (NRA-ILA 2013 b). Senator Inhofe introduced budget amendments to 
Senate Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 2014 to help protect and preserve the Second Amendment 
rights of law-abiding Americans. Amendment 139 would establish a deficit-neutral reserve fund for 
the purpose of preventing the US from entering into the UN ATT, and amendment 360 would 
establish a deficit-neutral reserve fund for the purpose of preventing a federal firearms registry (The 
Okie 2013). Senator Inhofe's amendment passed the full Senate 53-46 (NRA-ILA 2013 b). In 
addition, Sen. Jerry Moran, along with 32 cosponsors, has put forth a concurrent resolution that 
expressed the Senate's opposition to the ATT, as it ''fails to expressly recognize the fundamental, 
individual right to keep and to bear arms and the individual right of personal self-defense... and thus 
risks infringing on freedoms protected by the Second Amendment'' (NRA-ILA 2013 c). Similarly, 
Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont, the only Democrat with NRA A-rating in the Senate) urged Senate 
opposition to ATT, declaring that "It's our job to make sure any treaty the U.S. enters doesn't 
interfere with our sovereign ability to uphold the rights of Americans… The arms treaty simply 
doesn't include strong enough protections to pass that test, and I won't support any treaty that 
undermines the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding Montanans." (Ibid.).
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Chapter 6: Domestic gun control context 
The Arms Trade Treaty is an international treaty designed to foster peace and security by putting a 
stop to arms flows to conflict regions, thus preventing human rights abusers and violators of the law 
of war from being supplied with arms (UNODA 2013). In order for the treaty to be ratified in the 
United States, the US Senate has to approve the treaty by a two-third majority. The NRA has 
managed to turn a debate on the ATT into a domestic debate on gun control, and all discussions on 
any forms of gun control are very controversial in the United States. Thus in order to understand 
how likely it is that the US will sign on to the emerging small arms norm by ratifying the UN Arms 
Trade Treaty in the Senate, in addition to understanding the international situation, we need to 
understand the domestic context in which the debate is taking place. This chapter will provide an 
overview over domestic gun control debate. It will first summarize the main points around which 
discussions on guns often revolve. It will then present a brief overview over important Supreme 
Court cases related to gun control. The main focus of this chapter will be explaining the political 
situation after the Sandy Hook massacre, and the reactions of two main political actors in the 
political debate on guns, the Obama administration and the NRA, to the Sandy Hook tragedy.
6.1 Gun debate
The gun control debate in the United States causes people in other parts of the developed world to 
look at the country and ''shake their heads'', as it is difficult for them to understand why so many 
Americans have such passion for their guns, and why gun control is such a contentious issue 
(Henigan 2009: 1). 
Gun control is undoubtedly one of the most heated and polarizing issues in the United 
States, and pro-gun and anti-gun activists debate each other with intense passion (Winkler 2011: 4). 
One side sees guns as essential to personal freedom, while the other insists that guns are instruments 
of mayhem and violence. Guns are lightning rods of American culture, and in such charged 
atmosphere it is very hard to find common ground. All gun control proposals are very controversial, 
with the stakes often portrayed as ''nothing less than the future of life, liberty and justice'' (Ibid.). 
Moreover, gun control efforts always face an uphill battle against the powerful pro-gun lobby and a 
strong U.S. tradition of gun ownership and hunting (Felsenthal 2013). 
The gun control debate usually revolves around the ideological and legal aspects of the 
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issue. Gun-control proponents, for the most part associated with the American liberal perspective, 
believe that it is the role of government to protect their people through law enforcement, and that 
the citizens should rely on the police, security guards and alarm systems for protection (Kopel 1995: 
11). They also believe that gun control laws are necessary to stop gun violence. Gun-control 
proponents think that 100.000 Americans killed or wounded every year by gunfire is a problem, and 
propose gun control measures not because they are important per se, but because they see them as a 
pragmatic way to attack the problem. There is a lot of debate among gun control proponents over 
which reforms will be effective, which means that they do not look at gun control in terms of 
principles, but concrete solutions that could help reduce gun violence (Heningan 2010). 
The gun-rights proponents seldom debate the effectiveness of various gun-control measures, 
because for them all gun-control measures are invasions of God-given freedom (Heningan 2010). 
They also have different view on the society and the role of the government, both closely related to 
their view on guns. Gun-rights proponents are most often associated with conservative perspective 
in the United States. They generally believe that extensive power should be left in the hands of the 
people, and they distrust the state to administer justice by itself (Kopel 1995: 10). They also believe 
in society in which individualism and self-reliance are seen as highly desirable values. Guns are 
often seen as symbols of those values, and gun control is an unacceptable shift away from focusing 
on individual responsibility (Kessler 1988: 1).
The legal aspect is related to the interpretation of the Constitution. The gun lobby insists that 
the right to bear arms, just like the right to free speech, should be robust, unfettered, and uninhibited 
by any kind of government regulation (Winkler 2011: 9).  For years the gun lobby has used the 
Second Amendment as a rallying cry in the fight against gun control, portraying themselves as 
inheritors of the legacy of the Founding Fathers. Many in the gun rights community promote an 
uncompromising view of gun rights, seeing even modest gun laws as illegitimate and 
unconstitutional burdens (Winkler 2011: 8). They oppose virtually every gun control proposal, even 
widely popular laws such as background checks and restrictions on civilian ownership of machine 
guns, because they argue that any laws regulating guns threaten to put the country on a slippery 
slope to total disarmament. 'Pass this law, and eventually all civilian guns will be confiscated' (Ibid. 
8-9). To the gun lobby, ''the Second Amendment is all right, with little room for regulation'' (Ibid. 
8). 
The other side of the gun debate is also prone to its own brand of extremism. Some gun-
control proponents support most forms of gun control, even the ones that are not very likely to taper 
gun violence (Winkler 2011: 9). They insist that the Second Amendment is only about state militias, 
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and does not say anything about individual gun ownership. For them, ''the Second Amendment is all 
regulation and no right'' (Ibid. 10). However, most gun control groups, such as The Brady Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence and Mayors Against Illegal Guns, actually seldom engage in the debates 
about the meaning of the Second Amendment and what it entails. What they mostly do is work to 
pass, enforce, and protect sensible laws and public policy that address gun violence at federal and 
state level, trying to educate people and raise public awareness of gun violence (Brady Campaign to 
Prevent Gun Violence 2013). Mayors Against Illegal Guns, for example, say they support the 
Second Amendment and the rights of citizens to own guns, but at the same time more action must 
be taken to stop criminals from illegally obtaining guns and using them (Mayors Against Illegal 
Guns 2013b).
6.1.1 The Supreme Court
The Constitution often means different things to different people, partly because of the vague 
wording of the document. 
'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to  
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed' (U.S. Const. amend. II) 
As mentioned in the previous section, political controversy surrounding the gun debate in the US is 
to a big degree based on the Second Amendment. Gun rights advocates tend to ignore the clause 
before the second coma, arguing that the people, including private citizens, have the right to keep 
and bear arms. Those who support gun control measures disagree, arguing that the first part of the 
sentence is the main purpose of the Second Amendment, as the Founding Fathers meant to protect 
the collective right of people to form a militia. These are two most often cited interpretations of the 
Constitution that have been dividing the nation. Even the Supreme Court has had difficulty with 
making rulings regarding this issue, and virtually every ruling has been contested by the both sides 
of the debate.
For over six decades, the Supreme Court Decision United States vs Miller from 1939 has 
been cited as a landmark ruling which stated that the Second Amendment permits reasonable 
regulation of firearms. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the National Firearms Act from 
1934, which imposed a tax on the manufacture and transfer of certain firearms and mandated the 
registration of those guns (National Firearms Act 1934), is ''not unconstitutional as an invasion of 
the reserved powers of the states'', and it is ''not violative of the Second Amendment of the Federal 
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Constitution'' (United States v. Miller 1939). Even though there is a lot of controversy surrounding 
the US vs Miller case, and both sides of the gun control debate argue that the ruling supports their 
cause, there is a general agreement among academics that US vs Miller asserted that federal, state 
and local governments cannot prohibit arms altogether, but they can still reasonably regulate 
firearms. This means that the Second Amendment permits reasonable regulation of firearms (Frye 
2008: 82). The court also stated in a unanimous decision that the ''obvious purpose'' of the Second 
Amendment was to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of the state militia, 
and relying on that decision, hundreds of lower federal and state appellate courts had rejected 
Second Amendment challenges to the nation's gun laws over the last seven decades (Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence 2013).
The legal interpretation of the meaning of the Second Amendment changed dramatically in 
2008, when the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right to possess firearms in the home for self-defense (Raum 2012; Law Center to 
Prevent Gun Violence 2013). After having gone nearly 70 years without deciding a single case 
directly addressing the Second Amendment, starting in 2008 the US Supreme Court decided two 
such cases (Vernick et. al. 2011).
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court struck down Washington D.C.'s 
decades-old ban on handgun possession, as well as the requirement that firearms in the home must  
be stored disassembled and unloaded, or bound by a locking device (Dist. of Columbia v. Heller 
2008; Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence 2013). Through this decision, the Supreme Court 
inserted the judicial system into the ongoing national debate over gun laws in the United States. It 
was a watershed decision, representing a radical departure from the Court's previous interpretation 
of the Second Amendment of United States vs Miller. Even though the ruling is considered a 
watershed decision in favor of the gun-rights cause, it is not an absolute recognition of gun rights, 
as the ruling also affirmed that there are many regulations that are consistent with the Second 
Amendment, for example laws prohibiting firearm possession by felons and mentally ill and 
imposing conditions on the commercial sale of firearms (Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence 
2012). 
The Heller decision left unanswered questions, the most important of them being whether 
the Second Amendment affects state or local firearms laws, or whether it only limits the power of 
the federal government (Vernick et. al. 2011). This question, however, did not remain unanswered 
for long. On June 28 2010 in McDonald vs. City of Chicago case the Supreme Court determined 
that the Second Amendment does apply to laws enacted by state and local governments (McDonald 
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v. Chicago 2010; Vernick et. al. 2011). However, it has to be mentioned that since the Heller and 
McDonald cases, lower courts have overwhelmingly upheld the constitutionality of various gun 
laws and other handgun bans (Webster et. al. 2012).
6.2 Post-Sandy Hook political climate
After 20 year old Adam Lanza on December 14 2012 fatally shot twenty children and six adult staff 
members at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, Vice President Joe Biden 
said that ''every once in a while there's something that awakens the conscience of the country, and 
that tragic event did it in a way like nothing I've seen in my career'' (McCarthy 2013). Soon after the 
tragedy, prominent gun-rights advocates in Congress started calling for a national discussion about 
restrictions to curb gun violence, which signaled that the horrific elementary school shooting could 
be a tipping point in a debate that has been dormant for years (Pace 2012). 
It seems like Joe Biden was right. The Sandy Hook massacre appears to have swayed 
Americans' views on guns profoundly, the way no previous shootings ever did,. According to a 
New York Times\CBS News poll from early January, the Sandy Hook massacre has galvanized the 
broadest support for stricter gun laws in about a decade (Cooper 2013). The poll found that 54% of 
Americans, as opposed to 39% in April last year, think that gun control laws should be tightened. 
This rise in support stretched across political lines, including an 18% increase among Republicans 
(Cooper 2013; The New York Times\CBS 2013). When it comes to specific gun proposals, such as 
background checks, the poll found even wider support. The idea of requiring background checks on 
all gun purchases has the  support of 9 in 10 Americans. It is still difficult to say whether the 
Newtown shooting will have a long-term effect on public opinion, but the latest polls suggest a 
deeper, and possibly more resonating shift, compared to smaller increases in support for gun control 
that tended to immediately follow earlier mass-shootings (Ibid.).
After the massacre, Eric Garcetti, member of Newtown's city council said that local 
measures are not enough, and that is was time to make the conversation on gun control national 
(Lowery & Magerian 2012). The conversation on gun control did become national, and the 
following sections will provide an overview over political developments related to gun control after 
the Sandy Hook shooting.
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6.2.1 The reaction of the Obama Administration
During his first election campaign, Barack Obama campaigned on permanent reinstatement of the 
expired assault weapons ban. Eric Holder, Attorney General in 2009, stated that the administration 
would lobby for a bill, but the White House has mostly avoided talking about it. President Obama 
himself only expressed his support for the reinstating of assault weapons ban first in October 2012 
(Dwyer 2012). In October, the President broke his silence on the legislation which had persisted in 
spite of earlier mass shootings during his first term, saying that existing laws should be enforced 
better, and that weapons that were designed for soldiers in war theaters do not belong in the streets. 
For that reason, Obama said he would try to start a broader conversation about how to reduce the 
violence generally, and a big part of that was seeing if an assault weapons ban could be 
reintroduced (Ibid.). However, not much action followed that statement. After the massacre at 
Sandy Hook, however, the president vowed to use ''whatever power this office holds'' to safeguard 
the nation's children against gun violence, suggesting that he might put political muscle behind, 
among others, an assault weapons ban (Pace 2012). Unlike what happened earlier, this time rhetoric 
was turned into action.
After the Sandy Hook shooting, White House officials said that President Barack Obama 
would make preventing gun violence his second-term policy priority.  At first it was not clear what 
exactly Obama would pursue and how, and aides said that stricter gun laws would only be a part of 
any effort (Pace 2012). However, this time the first steps were taken without any delay.
As early as  in January 2013, president Barack Obama started exploring executive orders  to 
help prevent mass shootings in America (Levs 2013). 4The President knew that such a move would 
be very controversial in the gun lobby, but according to Joe Biden, the president was determined to 
explore every avenue (McCarthy 2013). President Obama created a new task force overseen by Joe 
Biden, that would provide concrete proposals by the end of January to reduce gun violence. The 
group, under the leadership of Joe Biden, included an array of Cabinet members, government 
officials, the victims of mass shootings and gun control advocates (Levs 2013, McCarthy 2013). 
Colin Goddard of the Brady Campaign, shot four times in the 2007 Virginia Tech Massacre, were 
among those addressing the group to push for tougher gun laws. Goddard argued that the 
overwhelming majority of Americans want comprehensive common sense changes to gun policy, 
and that there are common ground solutions that respect the Second Amendment (Levs 2013). 
On Wednesday January 23rd President Barack Obama announced the actions he would take by 
4 Executive orders are directives issued by the President of the United States under his statutory or constitutional 
powers that bypass the U.S. Congress and the standard legislative law making process (Longley 2013a). 
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Executive Order (Newsmax 2013). Among those were many actions related to background checks, 
launching a national safe and responsible gun ownership campaigns, reviewing safety standards for 
gun locks and gun safes and more (Ibid.). In brief, the President has used his executive powers to 
bolster the national background check system, create a million-dollar ad campaign aimed at safe 
gun ownership, and jump start government research on the causes of gun violence (Yager 2013). 
At first it was not even certain whether the debate on tighter background checks5 would 
happen. Many Republican senators sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid threatening to 
filibuster the Senate debate on background checks in early April, stating that they would ''oppose 
the motion to proceed to any legislation that will serve as a vehicle for any additional gun 
restrictions'' (Miller 2013).  Filibuster is a tactic in the US Senate used by opponents of a bill to 
block its passage. When a Senator is granted permission to speak by the presiding officer, he or she 
may speak indefinitely in an effort to delay or prevent a final vote on the bill. In order to halt the 
filibuster, the Senate must pass a 'cloture' resolution by a three-fifths (60 votes) majority (Longley 
2013b). Harry Reid said he found the letter he received from Republican senators ''deeply 
troubling'', and mocked it saying
“My Republican colleagues went so far as to send me a letter saying we will agree to nothing, there  
will be no debate, there will be nothing. We want you to do zero on anything dealing with stricter  
gun measures. They don’t even want to let us vote on this. … There is simply no reason for this  
blatant obstruction except the fear of considering antiviolence proposals in full view.”  (Miller 
2013)
With votes from moderate Republicans overall majority of 68 to 31, the debate could not be 
filibustered (Roberts 2013a). According to many commentators, the vote gave hope for the first in 
years substantive debate on control legislation, which in itself was a sign of how far the political 
mood has shifted since the Sandy Hook tragedy (Ibid.). On April 17th 2013, the Senate voted on the 
Manchin-Toomey Amendment, which was a compromise amendment between two moderate gun 
rights advocates, Democrat Joe Manchin and Republican Pat Toomey (Roberts 2013b). The 
amendment aimed to introduce requirement for background checks on all commercial gun sales. For 
a while it seemed that the amendment stood a serious chance of passing. However, the vote failed, 
with 54 votes for and 46 against. End even if the amendment was approved by the Senate, any gun 
control bill would still have to face tough sledding in the GOP-controlled House (Yager 2013). 
5 The Manchin-Toomey background check amendment was one of nine proposed changes to a gun control bill that 
the Senate debated in April 2012. Usually referred to as a 'background checks amendment' was a bipartisan 
compromise that was considered most likely of all proposed gun control measures to pass through the Senate, and 
the whole Senate debate is often referred to as a 'background checks debate'
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Almost all Senators who voted against the amendment have received substantial amounts of money 
from gun rights groups, including the NRA (Center For Responsive Politics 2013), and the way 
things look now, it is fairly clear that the Congress is very likely to fight Obama's gun control plans 
every step of the way. 
One would think that the background check compromise bill had everything going for it. It 
had bipartisan sponsorship of centrist senators, support of 90% of Americans, President Obama's 
full backing, a momentum created by tragedy, sympathetic advocates with gripping stories like the 
Newtown Families  and ex. Representative Gaby Giffords6 (Kroll 2013). So why did it fail? 
According to many commentators, the main reason for the failure of background check bill was 
NRA's unrivaled political power (Kroll 2013; O'Keefe 2013). Before the background checks vote, 
the NRA tightened the screws on senators by taking the unprecedented decision to award negative 
scores to any Senator that voted for a motion allowing the gun debate to go ahead. The NRA scores 
are widely used during elections to show Senator's adherence to the gun cause, and through this 
rating system the NRA has solidified its influence in the halls of Congress by holding politicians 
accountable by their voting records in gun policy (Nnamani 2013; Roberts 2013b). In a letter to 
Senators, NRA's Ececutixe Director Chris Cox wrote that NRA is ''unequivocally opposed'' the bill 
S. 649 which includes the Manchin-Toomey compromise amendment,  and given the importance of 
the issues the amendment covers, ''votes on all anti-gun amendments or proposals will be 
considered in NRA's future candidate evaluations'' (Cox 2013b). NRA's decision forced the 
Senators to choose between supporting the proposal and protecting their NRA credentials (Kapur 
2013). 
The NRA's opposition seemed to serve as a counterweight to public opinion. "It came down 
to politics, the worry that that vocal minority of gun owners would come after them in future 
elections," said the president (Steinhauser 2013). "They worried that the gun lobby would spend a 
lot of money and paint them as anti-second amendment. And obviously a lot of Republicans had 
that fear but Democrats had that fear too. And they caved to that pressure" (Ibid.). CNN Chief 
Congressional Correspondent Dana Bash analyzed the vote this way: "There is a feeling that some 
of these middle of the readers on the Republican and Democratic side decided that on this gun issue 
there was too much risk and not enough reward to defy the NRA lobby and many of the constituents 
in their states" (Steinhauser 2013).
6 Gabrielle ''Gaby'' Giffords is a Democratic politician and a victim of a shooting near Tuscon on January 8 2011 
which was reported to be an assassination attempt on her life. She was critically injured by a gunshot wound to the 
head.
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6.2.2  The NRA
In a press conference held one week after the Sandy Hook massacre, the National Rifle Association 
called on Congress to put armed police officers in all American schools (LoGiurato 2012). NRA's 
CEO Wayne LaPierre blamed what happened at Sandy Hook at everything from gun-free school 
zones, the media, movies, violent video games, and a lack of government funding for the influx of 
mass shootings in the U.S. He also repeated one of NRA's mantras, ''the only thing that stops a bad 
guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun'' (Ibid.). ''If it's crazy to call for armed officers in our 
schools to protect our children, then call me crazy'' said NRA head Wayne LaPierre during the press 
conference. ''I think the American people think it's crazy not to do it. It's the one thing that would 
keep people safe', he continued (McCarthy 2013). 
Not surprisingly, the NRA's reaction to Obama's gun control plans is far from positive. As 
usually, the NRA argues that it is very committed to keeping people protected, but that a focus on 
stricter gun control is completely misguided (Levs 2013). According to the NRA, gun control 
regulation erodes the rights of law-abiding gun owners, and any gun control is a step towards a 
complete gun confiscation. At the 2012 Conservative Political Action Conference, Wayne LaPierre 
warned  that the first-term Obama Administration 'lip service to gun owners is just part of a massive 
Obama conspiracy to deceive voters and hide his true intentions to destroy the Second Amendment 
during his second term' (Spaeth 2013). Obama's response to Sandy Hook validated LaPierre's fears, 
and NRA vowed that with the 4.5 million men and women of the National Rifle Association it 
would oppose Obama's efforts to enact the gun control agenda (NRA-ILA 2013 a).
Gun-rights proponents were also outraged by Obama's gun rights initiatives. With the NRA 
support, Rep. Steve Stockman (R-Texas) threatened to file articles of impeachment against 
President Obama if he tried to change gun regulations through executive order. ''I will seek to 
thwart this action by any means necessary, including but not limited to eliminating funding for 
implementation, defunding the White House, and even filing articles of impeachment'' (Gibson 
2013). He also said that the President's actions are an existential threat to this nation, and that any 
proposal to abuse executive power and infringe upon gun rights must be repelled ''with the stiffest 
legislative force possible'' (Ibid.). Further, according to Rep. Stockman, the President's actions are 
not just an attack on the Constitution and a violation of his sworn oath of office, but they are a 
direct attack on Americans that place every American in danger, because ''if the President is 
allowed to suspend constitutional rights on his own personal whims, our free republic has 
effectively ceased to exist'' (Gibson 2013). Some other Republican gun-rights advocates who want 
to impeach Obama over his gun  control proposals are Rep. Trey Radel (R-Fl), Rep. Louie Gohmert 
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(R-Tx), and  former Attorney General Edwin Meese (Shen 2013).
During the NRA annual national convention in Houston in May 2013, the NRA and friendly 
Republican politicians defended the gun lobby's hardline resistance to Obama's gun reforms. With 
speakers such as Sara Palin, Rick Santorum and Texas senator Ted Cruz. Ted Cruz, who led 
Republican opposition to new gun control regulations in April's US Senate vote, told the NRA 
crowd that ''every vote that would have undermined the Second Amendment was voted down. 
That's your victory, it's the victory of the American people'' (Pilkington 2013 b).
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Chapter 7: Why does the ATT face uphill battle in the US Senate?
The NRA has managed to turn the debate on the ATT into a domestic debate about gun control, 
where the group is able to exert a lot of power. The following sections are going to analyze three 
main aspects of NRA power: financial resources, ability to mobilize its members, and ability to 
frame the political debate. NRA's ability to mobilize its members and ability to frame the political 
debate are so closely related that they are going to be analyzed together in one section. The last 
section of this chapter will analyze different pressures the senators are facing on the ATT vote in 
the attempt to find out whether the ATT stands a chance of ratification by the US Senate.
7.1 NRA's Power 
It is sometimes argued that that gun control proponents focus too much on the NRA as their 
opponent. However, this obsession is very understandable given the level of influence NRA has on 
gun policy at every level of government. In fact, in 2001, Fortune magazine named the NRA the 
most powerful lobby in Washington (Heningan 2009: 1). Many commentators say that while there 
are many reasons why politicians are often silent on gun control issues, the most important of them 
comes in three words: National Rifle Association, a group that ''no politician should oppose if they 
want to keep their job'' (Hartung 2012b). 
The power of the NRA is rooted in many factors. While there is an overlap between them, 
the most important factors can still be divided into resources, the group's ability to mobilize its five 
million membership base to participate in various political activities, and the group's ability to 
control the national debate about guns (Berlow & Witkin 2013). The NRA gathers information on 
gun control and other issues important to the members, disseminated the information to the 
members, represents its members to elected officials, reports to the membership the behaviors of 
elected officials, and helps shape public opinion on issues (Kenny, McBurnett and Bordua 2006: 4). 
The following chapters are going to explore how the NRA uses its resources and how it mobilizes 
its members to be politically active. However, it is also important to understand why the NRA is 
able to exercise this kind of power, because clearly there must be something in their message that 
resonates with many people (Heningan 2009: 5). 
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7.1.1 NRA's financial resources
There is a huge disproportion between the power of gun rights and gun control activists. Since 
2009, gun rights advocates have spent almost 25 times more money in Washington than the groups 
advocating gun control. Between 2009 and 2012, gun advocacy groups have spent 20 million 
dollars on political contributions and lobbying, while gun control groups have spend 832 thousand 
(Cline 2012). The NRA itself accounts for about 60% of what gun rights interest groups spent on 
lobbying in 2011 and the first three quarters of 2012 (Martinelli & Merlin 2012). Since 2011, the 
NRA alone has spend 10 more on lobbying on the federal level than gun control groups 
(McCutcheon 2012). 
According to Center for Responsive Politics and Center for Public Integrity, the gun lobby 
has poured 81 million dollars into Senate, House, and presidential races since the 2000 election 
cycle (Berlow & Witkin 2013). Fourty-six million alone went to independent expenditures made 
since Supreme Court decisions in 2010, especially the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision 
(Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 2010). This decision allowed associations, unions, 
corporations and individuals to make unlimited independent expenditures aimed at either electing or 
defeating candidates in federal elections, as long as the expenditures are not ''coordinated'' with a 
candidate's actual campaign, thereby essentially redefining electoral politics (Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission 2010; Berlow & Witkin 2013). According to Lee Drutman from the 
Sunlight Foundation, members of Congress pay very close attention to how much money the NRA 
and other gun-rights group spend. The reason is that Senators and Representatives know that during 
the last election cycle, the NRA spent 18.6 million on various campaigns. They know what the 
NRA is capable of doing and the kind of ads they are able of running, which is especially scary to 
those who face close elections. The Congressmen know that if they cross the NRA, the group can 
potentially spend hundreds of thousands, or even millions of dollars in advertising against the 
candidates (Ibid.). 
From 2000 election cycle until 2010, the decade before Citizens United, much of the money 
was spent directly on political campaigns on all levels, and during  that period pro-gun interests 
dominated electoral spending so thoroughly that they rendered gun control forces irrelevant (Berlow 
& Witkin 2013). Between 2000 and 2010, gun-rights groups spent 28 times more money in House 
and Senate races than did gun-control groups, contributing with 7 million dollars vs 245.000 
dollars, respectively. Of the total of gun-rights spending, 3.9 million dollars were delivered by the 
NRA itself (Ibid.). Since the Citizens United decision, the gun-control cause has gained new 
financial muscle, mostly thanks to independent expenditures over 11 million dollars by New York 
58
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and other groups tied to him. This money is ''nothing to sneeze at, but 
still just a fraction of that $46 million in post-2010 gun rights money'' (Berlow & Witkin 2013).
According to the data gathered by the Center for Responsive Politics, donors associated with 
the NRA have heavily favored Republicans in their contributions since 1990, with an average 83% 
of the money leaning in the direction of right wing politicians in the last 2 decades. In the 2012 
election cycle, 89% of the NRA's contributions went to Republicans (Martinelli & Merlin 2012). 
During 2011-2012 election cycle the NRA's total independent expenditures amounted to 18,607,356 
dollars, out of which 41.506 for Democrats, 13,286,512 against Democrats, 6,218,408 for 
Republicans, and 220,616 dollars against Republicans (Martinelli & Merlin 2012). 
In the current Senate, 38 out of 45 (84%) of Republicans received NRA money during their 
most recent elections, and 42 of 45 (93%) have received contributions at some point during their 
career. Among Democrats, 4 of 53 (8%) received contributions during their most recent elections, 
and 8 of 53 (15%)  have received contributions at some point (Drutman 2012a). The
 following figure shows clearly that Republicans have received much more NRA donations than 
Democrats did (red dots represent Republicans, and blue dots represent Democrats).
Figure 7.1 NRA contributions to Senators in the most recent election
Source: Drutman (2012a)
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The reason why these numbers are important is that in order for the ATT to be ratified, it needs at 
least 67 votes in the Senate, which means that a substantial amount of Republican senators also 
have to vote for the treaty. Because the current Senate consists of 53 Democrats, 45 Republicans 
and 2 independent senators, and given that the amount of contributions to a significant degree 
corresponds with senators' allegiances, the ATT is likely to face an uphill battle in the Senate.
Although the NRA does not always win, and despite the fact that the NRA spending in the 
last election did not yield the desired outcomes, the group spends at levels that politicians both fear 
and crave, which is one of the biggest sources of the NRA substantial power and influence 
(Drutman 2012a). Still, during the 2012 election cycle, about 80% of the candidates funded by the 
NRA won their House or Senate races (The Washington Post 2013)
As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that in contrast to NRA efforts, there have been 
practically no resources and pressures on the other side of the issue  for decades (Drutman 2012b), 
which can be clearly seen in the graph below. The graph compares lobbying spending of the NRA 
with that of what has been the the biggest gun-control group for many years, the Brady Campaign.
Figure 7.2 Lobbying Expenditures of the NRA and Brady Campaign
Source: Durtman (2012b)
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However, as noted, a new player has entered the game. Mayor Michael Bloomberg founded Mayors 
Against Illegal Guns in 2006, and with personal fortune estimated at 27 billion dollars according to 
Forbes magazine, Mayor Bloomberg has entered the gun debate by organizing political allies, 
financing research, and spending a lot of his own money on pro-gun control TV-ads and elections. 
In fact, he said he is prepared to spend his entire fortune to support gun-control, or as he calls them, 
''anti-crime'' candidates (Berlow & Witkin 2013). However, even though a growing number of 
groups in favor of gun control have also been spending money in recent months, including Michael 
Bloomberg's Mayors Against Illegal Guns, all these efforts are still dwarfed by the NRA (Roberts 
2013). The NRA has spent 73 times what the leading pro-gun control advocacy group, the Brady 
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, has spent on lobbying in the 112th Congress (4.4 million 
dollars compared to 60 thousand through the second quarter of 2012) (Drutman 2012b). Because of 
this, the senators know that opposition to gun control brings in a flood of donations, political 
support (most notably the support of the NRA with all the resources that follow), while support of 
gun control brings political liabilities (the opposition of the NRA). With the gun-control side being 
so weak compared to the NRA, the calculus for the Senators is clear, and ''explains why the United 
States has among the most permissive gun ownership laws in the world'' (Drutman 2012a). 
7.1.2 Framing and mobilization
“For nearly 20 years, the NRA has fought tirelessly to oppose any United Nations effort to  
undermine the constitutional rights of law-abiding American gun owners. That fight has grown 
more intense lately, as the U.N. and global gun banners have moved to step up their attack on our  
Second Amendment freedoms by including civilian arms in the proposed Arms Trade Treaty.'' 
(NRA ILA 2013b)
The NRA is an organization with very substantial resources that they use effectively. However, 
other organizations, especially Mayors Against Illegal Guns, also have financial resources. So why 
is the NRA this powerful? Why is it the NRA that has the reputation of a group that ''no politician 
should oppose if they want to keep their job'' (Hartung 2012b)? As shown in the previous section, 
the NRA has an amazing ability to mobilize their members to participate in political activities, and 
they can get out votes on the election day, something that makes politicians fear the power of the 
NRA. But why is the NRA able to mobilize people so effectively? 
In addition to the financial resources, other important resources the NRA has at its disposal 
are the ability to frame the political debate and the ability to mobilize its members and other gun 
owners into participating in various political activities. According to many commentators, such as 
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Berlow and Witkin (2013), the NRA has managed to take almost complete control of domestic 
political debate on guns, and it has done it through the very skillful framing of the issues which 
relate to domestic gun control. This section argues that the NRA has also managed to take control of 
the debate on the Arms Trade Treaty. If the Obama administration could to a higher degree control 
the public debate, the ATT would stay where it belongs, namely in the realm of international 
cooperation. However, the NRA managed to take something that actually does not have anything to 
do with the domestic gun control, and make it into a domestic gun control issue, moving this debate 
to the domestic realm where the NRA has so much power. This might be the main reason why it 
will be very difficult to get the treaty ratified by the Senate. Still, the question is why has the NRA 
managed to make the ATT into a domestic gun control issue. As this section will show, it has 
everything to do with the NRA's ability to frame the issues and create a powerful narrative that 
appeals to NRA members and many other gun owners. This section will analyze how the NRA is 
framing the political debate, especially in regards to the ATT, and how this framing contributes to 
the group's ability to mobilize its members and other gun owners.
According to the resource mobilization theory, framing is one of cultural resources groups 
have at their disposal. Through framing, NRA calls attention to different issues by using language 
that names, interprets and dramatizes them. Framing is means through which NRA mobilizes 
people. Because not all individuals within a given society share the same 'culture' (Bailey 2009: 81), 
the frames the NRA is using mostly appeal to a particular target group, namely NRA members and 
often other gun owners. This section argues that the most important and effective frames the NRA 
is using is portraying the ATT as a threat not only to the gun owners' rights, but also a threat to the 
American identity. The other is making the NRA members and other gun owners believe that any 
form of gun control (and the ATT is full of gun control schemes and a threat to the Second 
Amendments rights according to the NRA) is a threat to them personally, thus making gun owners' 
self-interest a big motivation for political participation.
According to Kopel (1995) and Kessler (1988), the gun debate is mainly fought with the 
heart, rather than the mind, and ideological factors play a key role in this debate. While the actual 
physical characteristics of firearms and their use are important, the significance attached to guns 
quite often has little reaction to guns themselves. According to Kopel (1995) and Kessler (1988), 
guns have big symbolic value in the US, as they symbolize, among others, individualism and self-
reliance, and this is the main reason why proposals to regulate or prohibit firearms in the US 
generate so much passion.
A lot of support for the findings from Kopel (1995) and Kessler (1988) analysis was found 
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in the articles about the Arms Trade Treaty published by the NRA. During many campaigns against 
gun control over the years, the NRA has skillfully constructed the connection between guns and 
what they symbolize. One can even go as far as to say that the NRA has managed to construct a 
narrative where guns are closely related to the American identity, which often includes 
individualism, suspicion of government, and love of unrestricted freedom. This is a narrative that 
appeals to the NRA members and many gun owners. Thus, not surprisingly, when it comes to the 
Arms Trade Treaty, most of NRA's arguments against the ATT appeal to people's emotions and 
their sense of identity. The NRA's opposition to the ATT has less to do with concrete treaty 
provisions, and much more with the principles and ideas. Already in 2011, a year before the first 
round of real negotiations on the ATT, the NRA wrote that the Second Amendment is ''freedom's 
most valuable, most cherished, most irreplaceable idea'' (NRA-ILA 2012d). The NRA argues that 
history proves that when you ignore the rights of good people to own firearms, you enable future 
tyrants ''whose regimes will destroy millions and millions of defenseless lives'' (Ibid.). 
Almost a year before the first draft of the treaty was available, the NRA started framing the 
treaty as something that should concern ''not only every gun owner but also every freedom-loving 
American'', an ''all-out attack on the constitutional freedom of American gun owners'' (Cox 2011),  
and with every new draft the treaty was portrayed as even more frightening. At the same time the 
NRA portrays the Obama Administration as ''gun-grabbers'' who have done everything in their 
power to make owning guns more difficult or even illegal, and now by supporting the ATT they 
want to ''unleash the U.N. gun-ban axis on our right to keep and bear arms. It’s time for all 
Americans to sound the alarm on this treacherous assault on U.S. sovereignty'' (Ibid.). 
By creating this kind of narrative, the NRA captures attention of their members and many 
gun owners. Americans love their guns, and they often distrust the federal government and 
international institutions. In fact, people who say they have guns in their households continue to be 
more likely than those who do not to say that the government is a threat to their personal rights and 
freedoms. About six-in-ten (62%) in gun-owning households see the government as a threat, 
compared with 45% of those without guns (Pew Research Center 2013).
According to commentators such as Berlow and Witkin (2013), the NRA's genius lies in the 
group's ability to convince a substantial number of gun owners ''that they are at Armageddon's 
doorstep at any given moment''. Every issue can be framed in different way, and so far the NRA has 
been very successful in framing the ATT as an existential threat not just to gun owners, but to all 
''freedom-loving Americans'', and one of the most serious threats to American gun owners in 
decades' (NRA-ILA 2012b). Below is a good example of how the NRA makes the ATT sound like 
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one of the biggest threats that not only gun owners, but also people who cherish their freedom and 
their Constitution:
'The NRA represents hundreds of millions of Americans who will never surrender our fundamental  
firearms freedom to international standards, agreements, or consensus. America will always stand 
as a symbol of freedom and the overwhelming force of a free, armed citizenry to protect and  
preserve it. On behalf of all NRA members and American gun owners, we are here to announce that  
we will not tolerate any attack – from any entity or organization whatsoever – on our Constitution  
or our fundamental, individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms.'  (NRA-ILA 2012d)
As explained in the chapter 3.0, framing has four tasks (Bailey 2009: 81; Snow, Soule & Kriest 
2004; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Bentford 1986). First, a frame provides a diagnosis of the 
problem, specifies the nature of the problem and identifies its cause. The second task of frames is 
offering a prognosis, explaining how the problem is best tackled, and providing tactics and targets. 
Then it dichotomizes the players into clearly defined 'us' and 'them', and the fourth task provides a 
call to arms, or rationale for engaging in collective action (Ibid.). The NRA portrays the ATT as a 
vehicle for numerous ''gun-control schemes'', from gun registration and micro stamping to outright 
bans and confiscation, that could devastate Second Amendment rights of law-abiding Americans 
(Schmeits 2011; NRA-ILa 2012a). Further, the NRA vows to do everything in its power to stop the 
ATT from coming into force. The ''us'' in this case is NRA members and gun owners; the ''them'' is 
the Administration that has been anti-gun from the beginning and that in addition to supporting the 
ATT is now attacking gun rights at home, and ''the global civilian disarmament groups and their 
patron governments'' (NRA-ILA 2012e) working under the auspices of the United Nations that 
''represents the interests of governments- not citizens'' (Schmeits 2011). The call to arms is also 
present, as many of the articles on the ATT published by the NRA end with an encouragement for 
people to call their Senators and make sure that the ATT will not be ratified by the Senate. 
Through framing the issue in this way, the NRA is creating a counter-norm to the emerging 
international small arms norm. In fact, NRA's Schmeits said explicitly that ''our nation was founded 
for the precise purpose of escaping 'global norms' '' (Schmeits 2011). Just as norm entrepreneurs are 
critical for the emergence of norms, because they call attention to issues or even 'create' the issues 
by using language that interprets, names and dramatizes them Finnemore & Skikkink 1998: 897), 
the NRA has been acting like norm entrepreneurs working in the same way to counter the 
international small arms norm. The construction of the frames by norm entrepreneurs  is an essential 
component of political strategies, because when they are successful, the new frames resonate with 
broader public understandings (Ibid.). The frame that the NRA has been trying to create, which 
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includes the vision of the gun-hating Administration and ''global gun grabbers'' coming for your 
guns clearly resonates with many gun-owners belief that the federal government is not to be trusted 
and wants to disarm the American people, and that the treaty could give information about 
American gun owners ''into the hands of foreign governments, whose records on privacy may be 
even more questionable than that of the U.S'' (NRA-ILA 2013d).
International norms are deeply entwined with the workings of domestic norms, and they 
always have to work their influence through the filter of domestic norms, structures and influences 
(Finnemore & Skikkink 1998: 898). Even though it might sometimes appear that way, international 
norms do not simply trump the domestic ones, and domestic influences are strongest at the early 
stages of norm's life cycle (Ibid.). If we take the three-staged norm life cycle as a starting point, it 
seems that the small arms norm is still at its early stages. According to Finnemore and Skikkink 
(1998), the second stage of the norm life cycle is contagion, when international and transnational 
norm influences become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm change (902). 
The small arms norm must thus still be at the early stage, because domestic influences still seem 
very important, something that the NRA is exploiting to the fullest.
The NRA has been working with it's ''allies'', particularly in the U.S. Senate, trying to ensure 
that ''the Right to Keep and Bear Arms is not threatened by this or any future international treaty'' 
(NRA-ILA 2012c). The NRA boasts that it was on two occasions successful in convincing a 
majority of the U.S. Senate to sign letters to President Obama that made it clear that any treaty that 
included civilian arms was not going to be ratified by the U.S. Senate, and that the NRA members 
made their voices heard on the issue as well, calling their representatives and urging them to oppose 
the treaty, which resulted in 130 members of the House voicing their strong opposition to the treaty 
(Ibid.). 
The NRA also appeals to gun-owners self-interest. Self-interest does not always influence 
policy attitudes. However, gun control is one of the issues where self-interest is a very strong 
motivator, and the NRA has a lot to do with it (Wolpert & Gimpel 1998: 255). The NRA has 
managed to make the ATT into a domestic gun control issue, and portrays the treaty in a way that 
activates gun-owners self-interest, as the group has managed to convince many people that the ''UN 
gun-grabbers'' are coming for guns of American law-abiding citizens. ''And it ends with an outright 
ban on your guns!!!!'' (LaPierre 2013). This narrative fits into a broader NRA public relations 
campaign.
The NRA's public relations campaign makes two main arguments that highlight the self-
interested concerns of gun owners. First, it argues that gun regulations will not keep firearms out of 
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the hands of criminals, but will instead create burdens for law-abiding citizens and infringe on their 
rights as enshrined in the Second Amendment. The other argument is that the widespread gun 
ownership is one of the best deterrents to and defenses against crime (Ibid. 255). In addition, NRA 
usually uses the phrases as ''total gun ban'', ''gun confiscation'' and so on. Wolpert and Gimpel argue 
that the reason for using this kind of vocabulary and narrative is that banning handguns evokes 
stronger self-interest effects than banning assault weapons or imposing a waiting period on firearms 
purchases (Ibid. 241).  These arguments, coupled with the very high visibility of the NRA and the 
NRA's ability to mobilize its four million members, triggers self-interested concerns among gun 
owners' (Ibid. 255). This kind of narrative can be seen very clearly in how the NRA talks about the 
Arms Trade Treaty. On a web-page devoted solely to membership, NRA's Wayne LaPierre appeals 
to his fellow Americans, conveying the urgency of action, and how big of a threat the ATT is for 
every gun owner, as the UN is 'coming for their guns':
 ''What's happening RIGHT NOW in Washington, D. C. could spell disaster for YOUR guns and  
YOUR Second Amendment rights! Hundreds of gun-ban politicians, political appointees and 
bureaucrats are now writing regulations, casting votes and passing laws that could all but  
eliminate your right to own a gun. Their agenda starts with licensing, registering, fingerprinting,  
inspecting and cataloging every firearm, firearm owner and firearm transfer in the United States … 
And it ends with an outright ban on your guns!!!!Only you can stop the anti-gunners and prevent  
the obliteration of our Second Amendment rights...by joining NRA today'' (LaPierre 2013)
Because of the very skillful framing, the NRA's ability to mobilize its members into participating in 
various political activities, including voting, is legendary. According to the resource mobilization 
theory, this draws upon two types of resources. One is cultural (framing, discussed earlier in this 
section), the other one the resource mobilization theory calls social-organizational resource, which 
means, among others, ability to mobilize its members into participating in political activities, from 
voting and writing senators to participating in venues that build common identity. All these 
activities raise the salience of gun control, as well as provide information about the issue and 
candidate's position on it. This information helps individuals figure out what policy position 
maximizes their self-interest, thus the NRA activities create conditions facilitating the ability of gun 
owners to act in self-interested manner (Wolpert & Gimpel 1998: 255). Just as the NRA focuses 
almost exclusively on gun control, the NRA members are likely to be single-issue voters, which 
makes the NRA capable of delivering votes (Palmer 2012).  
In order to make it easy for the gun owners to decide who to vote for, the NRA grades 
candidates based on their voting record on issues. ''A+ ''grade means that candidate has excellent 
voting record and vigorous effort on gun rights, ''A'' grade means that he or she is solidly pro-gun, 
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backed the NRA on key votes or has a positive record on gun rights, ''B'' means that candidate may 
have opposed pro-gun reform of backed some gun restrictions, ''C'' means "not necessarily a passing 
grade" and ''mixed record" on gun votes, ''D'' grade means that candidate is anti-gun supporter of 
gun control legislation who can usually be counted to vote wrong on key issues. The worst grade 
NRA gives to candidates is ''F'', which means that candidate is a 'true enemy of gun owners' rights'' 
(The Washington Post 2013). Before the Senate vote on expanding background checks, Mayors 
Against Illegal Guns announced that it would be issuing its own rankings, hoping that they would 
provide a counterweight that would make it easier for 'on-the-fence legislators to side with the gun-
control crowd (Terbush 2013). However, according to Andrew Arulanandam, the NRA spokesman, 
the reason why NRA scorecards are so effective is that they have the weight of ''approximately 5 
million dues-paying members and tens of millions of other supporters behind them'', and the NRA 
will take that ''over the purse of one billionaire any day of the week and twice on Sunday'' (Ibid.).
Politicians fear the activism of NRA members, and with good reason. The NRA members 
are widely believed to be very likely to attend campaign events, ring doorbells, sign letters and 
make phone calls to help their favored candidates (Palmer 2012). According to NRA's David 
Keene, in a typical state NRA represents ''10% of the persuadable second Amendment votes'' on any 
given issue. The group represents people who are very passionate about their guns and gun rights, 
rely on NRA ratings of Congressmen, and are willing to pick up a phone and make a call when 
NRA asks them to do it (Berlow & Witkin 2013).Gregg Lee Carter, a sociology professor and editor 
of 'Guns in American Society', also emphasizes the role of political activism of NRA members. 
''The issue is not so much how much the NRA gives any senator or member of the House, it's how 
they can make their lives miserable. And how they make their lives miserable is they e-mail 'em,  
they call 'em, they fax 'em, they show up at meetings. The typical person who is for gun control is  
very different from the (pro-gun) person calling you or being right there, being an annoyance,  
hassling you personally. They're much more activist than the other side and that's what really  
produces their gains'' (Berlow & Witkin 2013)
The NRA's ability to mobilize members into political activities is so effective not only because of 
the skillful framing, but also because the group is very skillful when it comes to reaching out to gun 
owners, for example through arranging various activities. These activities build common identity, 
and raise the salience of gun issues. One recent example of how the NRA reaches out to gun owners 
is their latest national convention in Houston, where visitors could watch training and education 
demos, attend gun-related book signings, visit antique gun showcases and participate in many more 
gun-related attractions (Flock 2013). This is political activism, and this is what works. 
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Barack Obama once said that nothing is more powerful than millions of voices calling for 
change. The background checks amendment had according to polls 90% of support in the 
population. However, it lacked the support of Republicans and the Congress. According to many 
political scientists, among them Jonathan Bernstein (2013), public opinion does not equal political 
power. Despite what Barack Obama thinks, 90% of people in this situation is not really calling for 
change, but simple receiving a call (Chait 2013). 
According to a Quinnipiac University poll from 25-29 April, when asked ''Would you 
support or oppose a law requiring background checks on people buying guns at gun shows or 
online?'' 83 registered voters nationwide said they would support it. According to CBS News\New 
York Times Poll from April 24-28, between 86 and 89% Republicans, and between 94 and 96% 
Democrats favor a federal law requiring background checks on all potential gun buyers. A  Fox 
News Poll conducted by Anderson Robbins Research and Shaw & Company Research on April 20-
22 also found that over 80% of people favor expanding background checks on gun buyers 
(Pollingreport 2013). Moreover, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll, most 
Americans, including half of all gun owners, think that it is in fact possible to enact new gun laws 
without infringing on gun rights (Balz & Cohen 2013).
Still, despite such overwhelming public opinion support, the background checks amendment 
failed to pass through the Senate, Four months after the Sandy Hook tragedy, the gun-control 
proposal with arguably the best chance to pass through the Congress was defeated. A powerful gun 
lobby trumped public opinion (Steinhauser 2013). The background checks amendment did not pass, 
even though every national poll conducted in the past months indicated that the vast majority of 
Americans supported tougher background checks (Ibid.). Clearly, a well-funded and organized 
lobby is much more powerful than millions of voices calling for change (Chait 2013). The 
ABC/Washington Post poll highlighted an engagement gap between those who own and those who 
don't own guns. About one in five gun owners questioned in the survey said they have at some point 
contacted a public official to express their views on gun control. That number dropped by half for 
those in non-gun households. Nineteen percent of gun owners say they've contributed to an 
organization engaged in the gun control issue, with just 4% of non-gun owners saying the same 
thing (Steinhauser 2013).
As this section has shown, NRA framing leads to activism, and activism works. The NRA 
organizes gatherings, gun shows, has their members write and call their senators, and appeals to 
their members self-interest (or rather, what the NRA successfully gets them to think is their self-
interest) which makes them vote for NRA-approved candidates. A motivated minority that cares 
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passionately about an issue often carries more weight in Washington than a majority that is not 
quite as focused on that single issue. Action works. Public opinion is passive, and in politics passive 
does not work (Chait 2013). 
7.2 ATT vote in the Senate
As the ATT opens for signatures in very near future, this analysis of the political pressures of key 
senators in the Senate vote paint a very pessimistic picture for the treaty's ratification by the US 
Senate, as the political calculus points against the Senate voting for the treaty. Because, as discussed 
frequently in this paper, the NRA has managed to make the debate on the ATT into a domestic 
debate on gun control. This section will use the recent background check vote in the Senate as one 
vantage point for analyzing the chance that the Senate might approve the ATT.
The tables detail below presents different pressures the Senators face on the ATT vote. As 
explained in the section 4.0, all factors were collapsed into a single index, where five is most likely 
to vote for the ATT, and one is least likely. The index ranks senators relative to other senators from 
the same party (with two independents senators counting as democrats as they caucus with 
democrats). Because Democrats are in general more likely to vote for the ATT than Republicans, as 
they represent different political stands where Democrats generally are much more positive to 
various gun control measures than Republicans, the index scores are not comparable between 
parties. A Democrat with a score of three and a Republican with a score of three are unlikely to 
have the same probability of supporting the ATT. For this reason, there are two separate tables, one 
for Republicans and one for Democrats, both ranked by the index. More details and analyzes will 
follow the tables.
69
Table 7.1 Republicans ranked by index
REPUBLICANS
Senator State NRA 
Mone
y 
NRA 
Rating 
Obama 
vote 
share
Gun 
Owners 
Gun 
Businesses
/100.000
Index 
Mark Kirk Illinois 0 F 57% 20% 14 4,7
Marco Rubio Florida 0 B+ 50% 24% 12 3,5
Dan Coats Indiana 0 C+ 44% 39% 21 3,4
Susan Collins Maine 19,80
0
C+ 56% 40% 35 3,1
John McCain Arizona 17,35
0
B+ 44% 31% 20 3,1
Rob Portman Ohio 9,800 A 50% 32% 19 3,1
Dan Heller Nevada 18,40
0
A 52% 34% 19 3
Kelly Ayotte New 
Hampshire 
0 A 52% 30% 29 3
Ron Johnson Wisconsin 5,950 A 53% 44% 26 3
Jeff Flake Arizona 13,45
0
A 44% 31% 20 2,8
Pat Toomey Pennsylvani
a
27, 
250
A 52% 35% 18 2,8
Chuck 
Grassley
Iowa 19,85
0
A 52% 43% 41 2,5 
Richard Burr North 
Carolina 
30,75
0
A 49% 41% 21 2,5
David Vitter Louisianna 30,30
0
A 41% 44% 25 2,4
John Boozman Arkansas 15,90
0
A 37% 55% 41 2,1
Roy Blunt Missouri 60,55
0
A 44% 42% 36 2,1
John Hoeven North 
Dakota
4, 950 A 39% 50% 62 2
John Thune South 
Dakota
48,60
5
A+ 40% 57% 61 1,7
Lisa 
Murkowski
Alaska 14,40
0
A 41% 58% 93 1,1
Sources: The Washington Post 2013, The New York Times 2012, NBC News 2012, White 2013, Mayors Against 
Illegal Guns 2013a, United States Census 2012
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Table 7.2 Democrats ranked by index
DEMOCRATS
Senator State NRA 
Mone
y
NRA 
Ratin
g 
Obama 
Vote 
Share
Gun 
Owners
Gun 
Businesses
/100,000
Index
Brian Schatz Hawai 0 N/A 71% 9% 9 5
Mazie Hirono Hawai 0 F 71% 9% 9 5
Dick Durbin Illinois 0 F 57% 20% 14 4,7
Bill Nelson Florida 0 F 50% 24% 12 4,5
Scott Brown Ohio 0 F 50% 32% 19 4,4
Tim Kaine Virginia 0 F 51% 35% 19 4,4
Tammy 
Baldwin
Wisconsin 0 F 53% 44% 26 4,2
Kay Hagan North 
Carolina
0 F 49% 41% 21 4,1
Tom Harkin Iowa 0 F 52% 43% 41 4
Claire 
McCaskill
Missouri 0 F 44% 42% 36 3,8
Jeanne 
Shaheen
New 
Hampshire
0 n/a 52% 30% 29 3,8
Tom Udall New 
Mexico
0 C- 53% 35% 28 3,8
Bernie Sanders Vermont 0 D- 67% 42% 51 3,7
Mark Udall Colorado 0 C 51% 35% 27 3,6
Michael 
Bennett
Colorado 0 C+ 51% 35% 27 3,6
Martin 
Heinrich
New 
Mexico
0 B 53% 35% 28 3,5
Bob Casey Jr Pennsylvani
a
0 B+ 52% 35% 18 3,5
Mary Landrieu Louisianna 0 C- 41% 44% 25 3,4
Patrick Leahy Vermont 0 C 67% 42% 51 3,4
Angus King Maine 0 n/a 56% 40% 35 3,2
Harry Reid Nevada 10,450 B 52% 34% 19 3,2
Mark Warner Virginia 0 A 51% 32% 19 3,2
Mark Pryor Arkansas 0 C 37% 55% 41 3
Jay Rockefeller West 
Virginia
1,000 D 36% 55% 49 3
Joe Donnelly Indiana 15,900 A 44% 39% 21 2,5
Heidi 
Heitkamp
North 
Dakota
0 A 39% 50% 62 2,1
Joe Manchin West 
Virginia
9,450 A 36% 55% 49 2
Tim Johnson South 10,000 A 40% 57% 61 1,8
71
Dakota
Jon Tester Montana 0 A 42% 58% 104 1,5
May Baucus Montana 22,300 A 42% 58% 104 1,2
Mark Begih Alaska 0 n/a 41% 58% 93 1
Sources: The Washington Post 2013, The New York Times 2012, NBC News 2012, White 2013, Mayors Against 
Illegal Guns 2013a, United States Census 2012
To understand better how the vote on the ATT might play out in the US Senate, information was 
collected on 50 senators that were identified as potentially conflicted on the vote (section 4.0 
explains how the senators for the analysis were chosen). With 26 Republicans almost certainly 
voting against the ATT, and 24 Democrats almost certainly voting for the ATT, in order for the 
ATT to be ratified by the Senate at least 43 Senators, in addition to the 24 Democrats, would have 
to vote for the ATT. This is not a very good starting point for the Treaty proponents.
To assess how likely the remaining 50 senators might be to vote for the ratification of the 
ATT, data was collected on factors that are relevant to the vote. The assumptions were that 
following factors contribute to higher likelihood of senators voting against the ATT
1) The higher the rating from the NRA, the less likely the senator is to vote for the ATT.
2) The more financial contributions from the NRA, the less likely the senator is to vote for the ATT.
3) The higher percentage of gun owners in the state, the less likely the senator is to vote for the 
ATT.
4) The higher percentage of firearms businesses per 100.000 citizens in the state, the less likely the 
senator is to vote for the ATT.
5) The lower percentage of Obama vote in the 2012 election in the senator's state, the less likely the 
senator is to vote for the ATT.
By combining all factors into a single score, the final index accounts for both senator specific 
influences (NRA rating and NRA financial contributions) and state specific influences (gun 
businesses, gun owners, and Obama vote share in the state). As already mentioned, these scores are 
not comparable between parties, but rank senators relative to other members of the same party in 
terms of various pressures they face on the ATT vote. 
The Democratic senators from Hawaii, Brian Schatz and Mazie Hirono, both with a score of 
5, are most likely 'yes' votes, while Max Baucus from Montana and Mark Begih from Alaska at 1 
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and 1.2 respectively are most likely Democratic 'no' votes. On the Republican side, Mark Kirk from 
Illinois is most likely to vote for the ATT with the score of 4.7, while Lisa Murkowski from Alaska 
is least likely to vote for the ATT with a score of 1.1. Top 5 Democrats most likely to vote for the 
ATT have F rating from the NRA, have not received any NRA donations, come from states where 
Obama won in 2012, which also have very low percentage of gun owners and gun businesses. Top 
5 Democrats least likely to vote for the ATT have A rating from the NRA, 3 of them received NRA 
money, they all come from states where Obama lost in 2012, with high percentage of gun owners 
and very high number of gun businesses.
Out of  the Republicans in the top five most likely to vote for the ATT, four of them, except 
for Dan Coats (R-Indiana) represent states where Obama won in 2012, four represent states with 
low gun ownership (the exception here is also Dan Coats). Five of the Republican senators least 
likely to vote for the ATT all represent states where Obama lost in 2012, with high gun ownership 
rates, high (except from Roy Blunt, R-Missouri) percentage of gun businesses per 100.000 people, 
with A or A+ NRA rating and except from John Hoeven (R-North Dakota) have each received over 
14.000 dollars from the NRA.
A relevant factor which was not included in making this index, as it does not apply to 
everyone, is whether the senator is up for reelection in 2014, especially in a conservative state. In 
conservative states, where gun ownership is usually high, the senators are sensitive to this pressure, 
and voting for gun control measures could a senator very unpopular in their state, something that 
senators pay a lot of attention to especially if they face reelection in the near future. In regards to the 
background checks vote, whether or not the senator is up for reelection in 2014 was cited as very 
important factor both in predictions made by the Sunlight Foundation, and post-vote analysis by the 
Washington Times (Silver 2013, Drutman & Furnas 2013). According to the index this paper 
operates with, out of ten Democratic senators least likely to vote for the ATT, nine of them (except 
for Jeanne Shaheen, D-New Hampshire) represent states where Mitt Romney won the popular vote 
in 2012, and except for Jeanne Shaheen and Joe Donnelly (D-Indiana), all these states have gun 
ownership rate over 50%. Three of those senators are up for reelection in 2014: Mark Pryor (D-
Arkansas), Max Baucus (D-Montana) and Mark Begich (D-Alaska), which means that these three 
senators are even less likely to vote for the ATT than the index suggests. None of the top ten 
Republicans most likely to vote for the ATT according to my index are up for reelection in 2014.
The Sunlight Foundation made an analysis where it evaluated the chances of the Senate 
passing background checks amendment, The factors the Foundation used differ slightly from the 
factors this analysis employs. The Sunlight Foundation evaluated potential swing senators 
73
according to senator's vote share in their last election, Obama vote share in the senator's state in 
2012, financial contributions by both gun control and gun rights groups to both the senator and their 
opponent in the last election, and the number of firearms businesses per 100.000 people in the 
senator's state. The Foundation's analysis did not factor in the percentage of gun owners in the state. 
The Sunlight Foundation's predictions as to how senators would vote on the issue of background 
checks yielded similar results to the predictions this thesis makes about the ATT vote. Because the 
NRA managed to make the ATT issue into a domestic gun control debate,  it can be concluded that 
senators face similar pressures regarding the ATT vote as they did for the background checks vote, 
thus it is informative to compare those results.
The Sunlight Foundation analysis (Drutman & Furnas 2013) used a 0 to 10 scale, with 
senators with higher score being more likely to vote for the background checks than the ones with 
lower score. All senators with three or higher score on my index either had more than six out of ten 
on the Sunlight Foundation index, or were not included in the Foundation's analysis (the Sunlight 
Foundation did not analyze Democrats with F rating from the NRA because they assumed those 
would vote for the background checks regardless of other pressures). The five Democrats least 
likely to vote for the background checks according to the Sunlight Foundation's analysis are also the 
five Democrats least likely to vote for the ATT according to this analysis. Because the Sunlight 
Foundation did not analyze any Republicans with A rating from the NRA, as those were assumed to 
vote against the background checks regardless of other factors, it is difficult to compare these 
results with my analysis. The Sunlight Foundation gave Mark Kirk score of 10, according to this 
analysis he is also the Republican most likely to vote for the ATT with the score of 4.7. Dan Coats 
(R-Indiana) and Susan Collins (R-Maine) were in the middle of the scale in the Foundation's 
analysis, according to this analysis they are both among top five Republicans most likely to vote for 
the ATT. Dan Coats voted against the background checks amendment, Susan Collins voted for the 
amendment. The last Republican senators the Sunlight Foundation included in their analysis were 
Marco Rubio (R-Florida) and John McCain (R-Arkansas), with score of 1.03 and 0, respectively, 
meaning they would almost guaranteed vote against the background checks amendment. Marco 
Rubio did vote against the amendment, but John McCain voted for. According to my analysis, both 
of these senators are in the top 5 Republicans most likely to vote for the ATT. 
According to many commentators, in the end it was not only the Republicans, but also some 
Democrats from conservative states ''where gun rights are sacred, that sank the background checks 
compromise'' (Steinhauser 2013). Mark Begich (D-Alaska), Max Baucus (D-Montana) and Mark 
Pryor (D-Arkansas) all face reelection next year in conservative states, and they all voted against 
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the background checks amendment. So did Heidi Heitkamp (D-North Dakota). Even though she is 
not facing reelection next year, she represents a state with strong sentiment for gun owners rights. 
According to commentators, all these senators may have feared that voting for the amendment 
would hurt their re-election chances, especially with the extremely influential NRA opposing the 
amendment (Ibid.). 
According to President Obama, the background checks vote came down to politics, and the 
fear that a very vocal minority of gun owners would come after the senators who voted for the 
amendment in their last elections. "They worried that the gun lobby would spend a lot of money and 
paint them as anti-second amendment. And obviously a lot of Republicans had that fear but 
Democrats had that fear too. And they caved to that pressure" (Steinhauser 2013). The predictions 
this analysis made are mostly similar to the predictions the Sunlight Foundation made, and those 
were not perfect, but  very accurate in predicting the final vote. The background checks vote 
required 60 votes to pass, and it was rejected 54 to 46 votes. In order for the ATT to be ratified at 
least 67 Senators must vote in favor of ratification. Given that senators face similar pressures, and 
given how accurate the Sunlight Foundation's predictions were and how similar predictions this 
analysis made are, it is extremely unlikely that the US Senate will vote for the ratification for the 
ATT and thereby support the small arms norm.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
The proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons has been one of the growing security 
issues of the post-Cold War Era. Because of how serious the problems relating to the misuse of 
small arms and light weapons are, many governments and other actors have been voicing concerns 
about the absence of globally agreed upon rules and a binding framework to regulate the transfers of 
weapons. It seems that now the small arms norm is emerging, and states will soon have a chance to 
commit to the norm by signing and ratifying the UN Arms Trade Treaty. But what will the US do?
The Obama administration reversed the previous Bush administration policy of outright 
opposition to the treaty, which was a very important step, because the US is a critical state for the 
small arms norm. It seems that the Obama administration is committed to the small arms norm and 
willing to sign the ATT. However, in order for the US to ratify the ATT, it has to be ratified by the 
two-third majority in the US Senate. Unlike the administration, the Senate is an inward-looking 
body, much more prone to the domestic influences and pressures than to international norms and 
pressures.
Because of their unrivaled political power, the NRA virtually controls domestic political 
debate on guns, and it has managed to make the ATT, a treaty that aims to regulate international 
transfers of weapons, into a domestic debate on gun control, and all gun control measures are very 
controversial in the United States. Because of the groups ability to frame the debate, the NRA has 
succeeded in creating a mythology that the U.N. is in a position to endanger gun ownership in the 
United States (Vest 2000). Moreover, because the groups financial resources and the groups ability 
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to get out votes on the election day, many politicians are afraid to vote on measures the NRA 
opposes. Based on the analysis of different pressures the senators are facing for the ATT vote, it 
seems very unlikely that the US Senate will ratify the ATT.
Given how successful the NRA has been in framing the ATT debate their way, at the stage 
where domestic influences on the small arms international norm are still very important, the NRA 
creating a counter-norm might seriously harm the chances of the US ratifying the ATT, and given 
how important the US is for the success of the small arms norm because of its position as the 
world's biggest weapons exporter, it might really harm the entire norm creation process. 
What can the Obama administration do in this situation? It can, of course, continue to lobby 
for the treaty, challenge the NRA narrative and do all it can to convince Americans that the ATT 
would not have any impact on the rights that the US Constitution guarantees American citizens. 
Moreover, it could try to explain better why the treaty in all likelihood would not require the US to 
do anything more than it is already doing, because the US already has restrictions regarding arms 
transfers more rigorous than those in most other nations. However, William D. Hartung, the director 
of the Arms Security Project at the Center for International Policy, argues that the regulations and 
restrictions the US already has should be enforced more rigorously. Thus what Obama could also do 
is put all the power he has through the executive branch and make sure that the regulations the US 
already has are enforced.
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Appendixes
Table A1: List of Republican Senators not analyzed in this research
Names States
Richard Shelby Alabama
Jeff Sessions Alabama
Saxby Chambliss Georgia
Johnny Isakson Georgia
Mike Crapo Idaho
Jim Risch Idaho
Pat Roberts Kansas
Jerry Moran Kansas
Mitch McConnel Kentucky
Rand Paul Kentucky
Thad Cochran Mississippi
Roger Wicker Mississippi
Mike Johanns Nebraska
Deb Fischer Nebraska
Jim Inhofe Oklahoma
Tom Coburn Oklahoma
Lindsey Graham South Carolina
Tim Scott South Carolina
Lamar Alexander Tennessee
Bob Corker Tennessee
John Cornyn Texas 
Ted Cruz Texas 
Orrin Hatch Utah
Mike Lee Utah
Mike Enzi Wyoming
John Barasso Wyoming 
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Table A2: List of Democrats Senators not analyzed in this research
Names States 
Diane Feinstein California
Barbara Boxer California
Richard Blumenthal Connecticut
Chris Murphy Connecticut
Tom Carper Delaware 
Chris Coons Delaware 
Barbara Mikulski Maryland 
Ben Cardin Maryland 
Elizabeth Warren Massachusetts 
Mo Cowan Massachusetts 
Carl Levin Michigan 
Debbie Staberrow Michigan 
Amy Klobuchar Minnesota 
Al Franken Minnesota 
Frank Lautenberg New Jersey 
Bob Hendez New Jersey
Chuch Schumer New York
Kristen Cillibrand New York
Ron Wyden Oregon 
Jeff Markley Oregon
Jack Reed Rhode Island
Sheldon Whitehouse Rhode Island
Patty Murray Washington
Maria Cantwell Washington
93
Table A3: Index calculations
RATING OF CATEGORIES
Obama Vote Share Gun Business Gun Owners NRA Rating NRA money 
since 1990
36-42
43-49
50-56
57-63
64-71
1
2
3
4
5
86-104
67-85
48-66
29-47
9-28
1
2
3
4
5
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
9-19
1
2
3
4
5
A 
B
C
D
F
1
2
3
4
5
500,000 +
25-50
10-25
Under 10
None 
1
2
3
4
5
Note: The different groups have been classified in scores for the calculations of index per state. An 
example of such is 36-42 for Obama Vote Share is classified as 1. For detailed explanation for the 
choice of score classification, please refer to chapter 4.0 Research Design. 
Index calculations
The index for each Senator has been calculated by adding the scores of each factor and by dividing 
the total by 7. 
As illustrated for one of the Republican Senator from Illinois: 
Mark Kirk
NRA Money 0 = 5
NRA Rating F (weighted twice) = (5+5)
Obama Vote Share 57% = 4
Gun Owners 20% = 4 
Gun Businesses 14 (weighted twice) = (5+5)
Index calculation 
5+  (5+5)+  4  +   4  +  (5+5)
7
 = 4,7
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